Notes

Chapter 1: Crisis

Lyotard opens by explaining some representational models of society. He finds two primary models: A holistic model (derived from Talcott Parsons) and a dualistic model (often characterized by Marxism).

The totalizing view is the one promoted by science and views society as a self regulating system. Marxism sees to differ by positioning society in a different relationship with power and knowledge. However, the alternative offered by Marxism is still totalizing, and offers the same problems in understanding the social bond.

Lyotard’s aim is to show that classical “grand Narratives” have broken apart and dissolved. The role of the individual becomes prominent, but that has a tendency to lead to a certain isolation. However, Lyotard sees this as not a notion of disconnected islands, so much as nodes in a network.

The approach Lyotard uses is Wittgensteinean language games. Inquiry into the social bond exposes ideas of subject and referent, and issues of communication, which are essential to language. The social problem must not be understood as merely a communication issue, though, as that misses the role of attention in the language games.

Knowledge is a matter of significant interest here, and its role in understanding culture is significant, as knowledge shapes the matters of “how” in a society. Lyotard is interested in using the terminology of narrative to understand how knowledge shapes a culture. There are five reasons for using narrative:
Narrative carries values and positive and negative models.
Narrative is well adapted to language games.
Narrative has clear means of transmission.
Narrative has a certain rhythm and place in time.
Narrative, finally, belongs to no one, cultural narratives are open and cannot be contained by institutions.

The underlying implication to this seems to be that the understanding and transmission of knowledge is inherently dependent on these language games. Truth cannot be told or understood without using a narrative form, so, as a result, science is dependent on a narrative foundation to even establish its most fundamental rules. Mathematically this would probably relate to the acceptance of axioms, or the meta-language understanding of how to reason about axioms.

Turning to how knowledge is legitimized via narrative approaches, or alternatively, the narrative of legitimization: Lyotard finds a political and philosophical approach. The division that is established seems to be in the role of science, whether it is for itself, or for the state, or for humanity. Science is delegitimized when its narrative is somehow vulgar. Science is incapable of legitimizing itself, and so languages of science that die out will lose their legitimacy. Conversely, new languages are created and are added to the old.

The postmodern era is characterized by a splintering of languages, science takes on multitudes of meanings and ideas. The postmodern world is about a legitimization that is not dependent on performativity (that is, it does not need to work for it to be legitimate, and vice versa).

Overview

Eagleton is a philosopher if nothing else. This work looks at the concept of the Aesthetic through Western (generally German) philosophy and ideology. He moves through a multitude of philosophers using each to push the aesthetic to an ultimately liberating Marxist concept. The Aesthetic is an interesting value, very human and essentially embodied.

Notes

Eagleton starts by looking at the liberal tryptych of class, race, and gender. He brings this with the centralized theme of the body, connecting it with the state. “I try in this book, then, to reunite the idea of the body with more traditional politics of the state, class conflict and modes of production, through the mediatory category of the aesthetic; and to this extend the study distances itself equally from a class politics which has little of significance to say of the body, and form a post-class politics which takes refuge from such rebarbatively ‘global’ matters in the body’s intensities.” (p. 7-8)

Aesthetics is about the study of bodily sensation, reaction, and experience. This is opposed to “reason”, essentially the dual of the aesthetic sense. Aesthetic relates to somatic perception. This compares with Clark and Alison Adam, on AI and embodied understanding. The aesthetic, like reason, is a bridge between the material and immaterial, and thus applies a similar abstraction between the conceptual and the world. In this regard, the pair of aesthetic and reason map to modeling and representation for simulation. (p. 13)

Eagleton discusses custom as perceived by Kant and Hegel: “This centrality of custom, as opposed to some naked reason, lies at the root of Hegel’s critique of Kantian morality. Kant’s practical reason, with its uncomprimising appeal to abstract duty as an end to itself, smacks rather too much of the absolutism of feudalist power.” (p. 20) In this morality, custom is aestheticized as moral. This puts a feudal motivator behind the means that customs emerge to maintain the cultural values of a society.

The aesthetic as applies to law and morality: Judgment, character, virtue, morals are seen as aesthetic values. A utopian state focuses on internal aesthetics: the law is embodied and internalized. This relates to simulation and the embedding of values and laws. Simulated societies do not usually operate on the sense of aesthetics, though. “A sound political regime is one in which subjects conduct themselves gracefully — where, as we have seen, the law is no longer external to individuals but is lived out, with fine cavalier insouciance, as the very principle of their free identities.” (p. 37)

Another approach: Mimesis and the grounds for social foundation: The law is built on reflected imitation. From this perspective, laws are learned values. But, Burke believes that aesthetic values are universal. This pulls back again to explicit and implicit customs as discussed by Goffman. (p. 53)

Some dizzying takes on “the subject”. Modern independence is defiant and isolating. Kant tries to repair the damage to the subject wrought by Hume. The subject is undefinable and unidentifiable. It *exists* in as much as it is *not* an object. Derrida: it is a kind of nothing. Embodiment is reduced to an aesthetic phenomenological thing. (p. 73)

On representation: A sparring between Kierkegaard and Hegel. The Hegelian system cannot be lived, it is purely conceptual. “Reality is an organic artifact, but it cannot be spontaneously known as a whole through aesthetic intuition. Wisdom for Hegel is finally conceptual, never representational: the whole can be grasped through the labor of dialectical reason, but not figured there. Art and religious faith are the closest approximations we have to such concrete imaging; but both involve sensuous representations which dilute the clarity of the concept.” (p. 150)

This seems to relate to sociology again: The conflict between lofty cereberalism and embodiment. Schopenhauer seems like an interesting base for looking at simulated models. “If humor and hopelessness lie so close together, it is because human existence for Schopenhauer is less grand tragedy than squalid farce. Writing in the toils of the voracious will, driven on by an implacable appetite they relentlessly idealize, men and women are less tragec protagonists than pitiably obtuse.” (p. 155)

The role of the subject in morals and compassion. The matter of the subject leads to a paradox: “Moral action, like aesthetic knowledge, would thus appear to be an unthinkable paradox. For there can be no practice without a subject; and with subjects come domination and desire. To speak of a compassionate subject would seem oxymoronic: even if a purely contemplative benevolence were possible, it could only realize itself in action at the cost of falling prey to the voracious will.” (p. 165)

Through history, morality originates in compulsion, and then becomes custom, and finally it becomes gratifying virtue or instinct. (p. 236)

Self identification and nature. Sentimentalism aestheticizes nature as benign. Nature is made to seem like mankind and is anthropomorphized. This seems to relate to simulation very nicely. Eagleton is discussing Nietzsche and his reaction to sentimentalists who project their values onto nature. “Such thinkers merely project their own arbitrary values onto reality and then, in an act of ideological consolation, unite narcissistically with their self-image. In a subtle gesture of dominion, philosophy always fashions the world in its own likeness.” This resembles naive modeling, and in simulation has the capacity to reflect varied understandings of value systems. (p. 249)

On Freud, and the self-thwarting nature of the superego: “But this social order inevitably entails a renunciation of instinctual gratification; so that part of our aggressiveness is driven back upon the ego to become the agency of the superego, source of law, morality and idealism essential to the operations of society. THe paradox, then, is that the more civilized we become, the more we tear ourselves apart with guilt and internal aggression. Every renunciation of instinctual satisfaction strengthens the authority of the superego, intensifies its brutality and so deepens our guilt. The more admirably idealist we grow, the more we stoke up within ourselves a culture of lethal self-hatred.” (p. 270-271) Now, Freud should not be taken as “correct” in any sense, but this is a beautiful system of torment that would be excellent to address via simulation. Simulation allows us to say things like “suppose Freud is right about this, what would happen?” and go! Many works of literature do use these foundational concepts , but rarely do they give us the capacity to explore their procedural complications.

Adorno may find himself in agreement with Weizenbaum. Rationality and thought are violational. Rationalism relates man to object and serves to oppress. To Adorno, thought is inherently pathological. Calculated rationality and the reduction of the self to reasoning machine deprives us of our humanity (hence Aushwitz). “Emancipatory thought is an enormous irony, an indespensable absurdity in which the concept is at once deployed and disowned, no sooner posited than surmounted, illuminating truth only in the dim glare of light by which it self destructs.” (p. 347) This analysis is highly evocative of the self-destructive impulse of humanity and is the nucleus of post-nuclear anxiety.

Overview

Convergence culture is about the convergence of media (and media devices), and the corresponding divergence of artifacts across media (both in terms of access and adaptation). Convergence occurs from the top down (corporations imposing convergence and promoting convergence in ways that is profitable.), as well as from the bottom up, being encouraged and organized by consumers, who aim to use convergence as a popular device.

Convergence is relevant from both the perspective of adaptation, as well as that of cultural analysis. We could look from Geertz’s perspective and treat cultures as texts, then we could think of culture in general as a medium. The artifacts of this medium would be cultural practices and values. Given this perspective, convergence from Jenkins’ perspective makes quite a lot of sense in that convergence brings together cultural practices with media artifacts in new ways.

A standing question is why is convergence a new phenomenon? Convergence has happened for quite a while before new media and the internet. What is new is (arguably) the increased participatory power of consumers.

Assorted Notes:

On death of forms of media: There are always persistent cries that some types of media are going to replace others, but this is usually a fallacy. The applications and functions of media may change; the content may change, audience may change, but media will not die.

Convergence resides in knowledge of consumers, connects Pierre Levy’s concept of collective intelligence. Convergence culture is how collective meaning-making changes how institutions operate.

Strongly referencing Negroponte’s “Being Digital”. The relation of new technology and culture is similar to Duguid and Brown’s social life of information.

However, Jenkins looks at businesses (in a New Orleans conference) interested in pursuing long term change and other interests via technology, they aim to use and profit from technology, or to save themselves from potential threats exposed by technology.

Ithiel de Sola Pool was the first to lay out the concept of convergence. Divergence of media into multiple modes is another perspective on the same phenomenon. Walls are breaking down separating media and content. Pool also predicted against sudden change, but rather gradual constant force operating in the background. Jenkins’ goal is to explore how convergence affects consumers.

One fallacy about convergence pertains to the “black box” which is a single piece of ubiquitous technology that everyone uses to receive media. This is a fallacy due to cultural forces and consumer appropriation.

Convergence is both a top-down and bottom up process, run by producers and consumers. In participatory culture: consumers are active and seek out content; changes the relationship between consumer and producer. Consumption is a collective process.

(ch 6) Consumption mixes and blends with politics. Enzensberger: “If information is power, then this new technology is distributing power.” Jenkins poses a universality of the power of photoshop, but there is a small part of the population that has access or knows how to use it (legally or illegally)

Applications

Looking at cultures as texts — as a kind of media Geertz looks at culture as a text, thus it could be considered a medium? So, could we look at culture as a medium (but not for artifacts, but for practices and values) and these things can be subject to the same sorts of values that arise in other media artifacts.

So…. culture of terror:
culture holds values of terror
politics gets infused into entertainment (comedy shows, sitcoms)
carries through in other media which, (through or in artifacts) carry the values
carries through in films (artifact media), in tv and radio (instant media), news and www portals(delivered media)

political speeches exist as medium, reference each other
with YouTube, it is possible for these to be compared easily
web enables large diversity and access of information
tv media is afraid to cover policy, but cover instead strategy of candidates

maybe… culture of Disney
values of Disney
also has fan culture (long before internet)
but w mousketeers, Disney gave people the false impression of fan culture in control
theme park wrt film occurs in Walt Disney’s time, so Convergence is not a contemporary thing
theme park, as media experience, rides, surroundings
Baudrillard would have a lot to say about American values reflected in Disney
shows, animated movies, MERCHANDISE, (contemporary) games, etc
with internet, however, comes the copyright insanity

Disney is an interesting example, because it employed convergence on a significant scale long before new media ever appeared.

who controls the media (the channels of media), and thus carries the values? Convergence is the convergence of values.

Notes

This is an analysis of fan culture, but from the perspective of a fan and cultural theorist.

Fans are a borderline cultural group, they are diverse, and exist at intersections of different cultural groups. Thus, the traditional sociological treatment of hegemonic culture falls apart a little in discussing fans.

One aim is to challenge the images of fans as depraved social misfits. And the goal is to replace that with the notion of active readers.

Textual poachers explicitly derives from DeCerteau, who described active readers as “poachers”, who refuse to absorb content as mere consumers. They occupy a position of weakness and desperation, petitioning media producers to keep the integrity of their favorite characters.

“Fans must actively struggle with and against the meanings imposed upon them by their borrowed materials; fans must confront media representations on an unequal terrain.” (p. 33) Producers and consumers often have conflicting interests, and this can lead to suspicion and open opposition over media artifacts.

Poaching is not misreading, rather it is an appropriation. Misreading implies that there is a “correct” approach to finding content, and anything else is false. This struggles with but does not obviate authorial intent. It also challenges traditional semiotic communication theory (Stuart Hall’s encoding and decoding). Even in Stuart Hall’s understanding of oppositional readings, it is necessary for the reader to have a stable position, which is lacking in popular tactics. Poaching is thus more fluid.

Poachers are also nomads, they travel intertextually, appropriating new materials, and constructing new meanings. Jenkins diverges from DeCerteau in claiming that fans take these new and appropriated meanings and become producers themselves. It seems though that fan created content is always at a second class compared to produced content.

Textual Poachers 6: Welcome to Bisexuality

This chapter is on fan writing, specifically the phenomenon of slash fanfiction. The term “slash” itself derives from the way that the stories are signified to the community. Examples are Kirk/Spock or simply K/S, but this can naturally be extended to other areas of fandom Potter/Snape, etc.

Jenkins provides a rather holistic discussion of slash, the communities that arise around it, and various theories put forth by scholars of cultural studies on the matter. This approach is somewhat dangerous, since it runs the risk of simplifying a very broad and widespread phenomenon into something that can be theorized about generally. It is important to note that it is a widespread phenomenon and is highly diverse in nature, thus the communities around it are similarly diverse and complex.

Nonetheless, Jenkins starts with a historical account of Slash as pertains to Star Trek, originating in the early 1970s. Reception to the writing has been generally very negative (usually from the perspective of official writers or other fans).

To fans and slash writers, the fiction serves a more complex role: It allows for an exploration of and a challenge to traditional gender roles. (Stoltenberg) It also allows a projection of sensuality into masculine characters. (fan writer Joan Martin) Joana Russ sees slash as giving insight into female sexual fantasy.

It is important to note that slash reading and writing is predominantly a female phenomenon. In this sense, it serves to look at romantic literature as studied by Janice Radway, who finds that romance gives a release from the traditional patriarchal gender roles, while simultaneously reinforcing them. Slash serves a similar function, but by virtue of being fan created, it is necessarily reflective and exploratory.

The ambiguity and androgyny (or hyper-masculinity) of characters in slash echoes the reflectiveness found in Turkle’s study of chat room gender play. Ultimately, slash is a kind of “making do” to use DeCerteau’s term, with the content provided by popular media. The gender deconstruction of the characters, as well as the identification with their masculine status sounds like a tactic for co-opting gender for the slash community.

Slash has a formulaic structure with several phases:

1. A perspective on the initial relationship.
2. Masculine dystopia.
3. Confession.
4. Masculine utopia.

The fascinating thing about this is that it reflects very sharply the formulaic structure of Romance by Radway. (http://www.icosilune.com/Research/012_radway.php) The parallel here is that both serve to restore a utopia of emotion. Jenkins leaves off claiming that slash serves to challenge traditional masculine roles, but its existence is evidence of a poaching tactic to find emotional fulfillment in a landscape of cultural artifacts that is lacking.

All cultural artifacts and products of creative expression come laden with implicit ideology of the producers. When fans take these artifacts and poach them, they introduce new values into their creation, which is a synthesized product. However, within participatory culture, the separation between producers and consumers can narrow significantly. When this occurs, what happens to the ideology of the artifact and synthesized products?

Overview

Originally, this was going to be on the Poetics itself, but instead this is a text that summarizes and extrapolates on the subject. Cooper expounds on the Poetics a great deal, specifically addressing its context and its reception over time. The poetics themselves outlines a theory of drama, specifically addressing epic poetry and theatrical tragedy. Aristotle breaks things down into categories and establishes the properties of these categories in an extremely methodical format. It is questionable as to how contemporary types of drama or media which cross many boundaries would fit into or adjust his system of classifications. The type of drama that Aristotle espouses though has a very formal structure, but is general enough to explain a great deal of modern instantiations of this format.

Notes

Some context on the Poetics in its contemporary setting: there was a conflict between the Homeric rules of art versus “higher” philosophy as dictated by Plato. “In prose, it has been assumed that the Dialogues of Plato were background and incentive to the treatise of Aristotle; it is often held that the Poetics is a defense of poetry against the attacks of Socrates upon Homer and the dramatists in Books 2, 3, and 10 of the Republic.” (p. 9)

Aristotle’s background and concern was as a biologist. He was primarily concerned with treating things as organisms to uncover their properties. Later on he relates the study of poetic works as bodies with different parts. Aristotle’s concern is looking at the meaning and purpose of a work and understanding it as a whole, rather than analyzing the individual parts independently. Compare this approach with the unit versus element or system. Also, this is interesting in terms of modeling and simulation, to explore things in terms of functional properties. Aristotle ostensibly was constructing a model or grammar of poetics in his work. (p. 11)

Elaboration of the above: “Since he regards a work of art as a living organism, he likens each several kind of poetry, and indeed each individual poem, to an animal, and will consider its ideal form or structure as related to the proper end or function of the art.” There is emphasis on the classification or categorization: Each has its own form and function, and its own ideals. This relates heavily to Sorting Things Out, wherein classification is seen as a highly moral and judgmental process. Aristotle (and his contemporaries and many followers) see moral judgments as being the aim of this classification, rather than precautions to be considered. One of the aims of the Poetics is to defend and justify the epics of Homer in consideration of the “better” dramatic form that is Tragedy. (p. 15)

An interesting trend begins here, which concerns “imitation” or mimesis. The purpose of poetry, to Aristotle is to hold up the mirror to human nature. The value of this is at odds with Plato’s treatment of poetics in the Republic, which claims that there are three types of objects: The ideal, which is “made by God” and discussed by philosophers; the real, which is made by craftsmen; and the representative, made by artists capturing the craftsmen’s work. By being twice removed from the ideal, the poetic representation has less value. A humanist objection occurs from focusing on the world of the living instead of the divine ideals, and that seems to be what Aristotle is trying to do. The layers of abstraction and reference is an interesting apt comparison to modeling and simulation, where the abstraction works in the opposite direction: moving from base hardware (ones and zeroes) to symbolic representations and attempting to work towards artistic and humanistic directions. (p. 19)

Aristotle is good at providing bullet points for summarizing the properties of his classes. In order of importance, the qualities of tragedy are: (1) Plot (or action, the events that take place). (2) Moral bent in the agents. (3) A display of arguing, thinking, inferring, and reasoning. (4) The use of diction as the medium for the representation of the above. (5) A musical element. (6) The element of spectacle. In the next section, Aristotle discusses the principles for constructing tragedy, and the nature of its mimesis. “Tragedy is defined in terms of (1) of the object imitated–men in action; (2) of the medium of imitation–embellished language; (3) of the manner of imitation–direct presentation; and (4) of the function of tragic arg–the arousal and expurgation of pity and fear.” The final point is the definition of tragic catharsis. In drama, an interactive element changes this dynamic significantly (Consider Mateas). The focus on the player and the interaction necessarily pushes the plot down to a subservient priority. (p. 29-30)

Choice (of characters) forms the core essence of character; while the action itself is the essence of the tragedy itself. Characters think, reason, choose, and then act. The choice itself is ultimately less important than the ultimate action, but it is still significant. Compare this treatment with that of AI and choice and planning? (p. 34)

Some elements of plot: Reversal (falls or redemption), Discovery (revelation of knowledge unknown to characters, or possibly audience), Suffering (actual empathetic suffering, or more likely violent physical suffering, agony, or death). These are the building blocks for establishing a tragic plot. These must ultimately be bound to what is realistic for the character, though. A clever character should not fall from being outwitted; after all, he was clever. Rather, this combination of conditions leads to the emergence of the tragic flaw, the tear in an otherwise strong and moral character. (p. 46) Interestingly, this can be seen as an emergent property rather than a definitive one. Were interactivity or other factors introduced, their properties and “ideal” forms could be distilled and it would be possible to identify things that emerge that meet the preconditions.

Cooper touches briefly on comedy: Aristotle neglected comedy in the poetics, and it was perhaps something to be addressed in a work that never survived or was put to writing. Cooper cites a work, the Tractatus Coislinanus, which is a mere fragment, but seems to follow the Poetics, “After noting the place of comedy among the types of poetic art, it begins with a definition echoing that of tragedy in the Poetics: ‘Comedy is an imitation of an action that is ludicrous and defective, of adequate magnitude; [in language variously embellished,] the several kinds of embellishment being severally used in different parts of the play; carried on by agents, not in the form of narrative; through pleasure and laughter effecting a catharsis of comic emotions. Comedy has laughter for its mother.'” The focal point seems to be on the language used, not the actual plot or events thereof. It seems hard to seriously imagine comedy as being merely language driven, since it could operate in much the same fashion as tragedy can, especially given more modern approaches thereof. (p. 69-70)

Aristotle and unity: Each poetic form has an underlying essential characteristic, without which a work does not match the form. “The Poetics contains the beginnings of scientific grammar.” This grammar bears a resemblance much more to Proppian or symbolic grammars rather than actual language. As in these, the emphasis of statements is merely symbolic and referential in nature. With such abstraction, drama ceases to be about the content of its narrative, but rather about the form itself, each member of a category being a reference to the larger mythology of the dramatic category as a whole. (p. 80)

Overview

Lev Vygotsky studied developmental psychology in Soviet Russia, approaching psychology from a peculiar perspective that differed from both western scholars and his Soviet contemporaries. Vygotsky approached psychology from an almost linguistic lens and attempted to reconcile problems that he found lacking in the approaches of other psychologists. Piaget is Vygotsky’s favorite whipping boy, and much of the work is aimed at critiquing Piaget’s work, which was the widely accepted western standard. In Thought and Language, Vygotsky looks at the process of learning language in human development as being directly related to thought and consciousness. Notably, he claims that the autistic speech of the toddler evolves to become the inner speech of the adult.

Notes

Psychology is the focus: Human function vs natural or biological. The focus is on the subject, not on the theory. Vygotsky’s approach is heavily influenced by Hegel. (p. xv) Vygotsky places importance on the distinction between conscious and unconscious action, which separates him from behaviorism. (p. xvi) The challenge of consciousness: Cannot define or explain consciousness in terms of itself! Cyclical pattern is a failing of theory. Social behavior relates to consciousness. “The mechanism of social behavior and the mechanism of consciousness are the same…. We are aware of ourselves, for we are aware of others, and in the same way as we know others; and this is as it is because in relation to ourselves we are in the same [position] as others are to us.” [Lev Vygotsky, “Consciousness as a problem of Psychology of behavior,” Soviet Psychology, 1979, 17:29-30]. Connection with George Mead: Mead’s struggle with behaviorism and Vygotsky’s struggle with consciousness are similar. (p. xxiv) The idea of context is the point of contention between Vygotsky and his Soviet contemporaries, especially Zinchenko. There is conflict over semiotics and role of history. (p. xlviii)

In author’s preface: speech and inner speech are a gallery to thought, as a new theory of consciousness. (p. lxi)

Vygotsky critiques methods of analysis: elemental psychology, deconstructs psyche into elements. This approach is flawed like only looking at elements in the periodic table in chemistry (as opposed to their interaction with each other) Sounds like a conflict between unit and system, interaction and independence. (p. 4) Looking at Gestalt psychology and association psychology. Major claim: Words are generalizations: connection of language and thought. Meaning making is an act of though. Communication is a spread of affect. Communication spreads and shares feelings and sensations, a frightened goose does not tell its flock what it has seen, but spreads its fear. (p. 6-7)

Criticism of Piaget: Refusal to apply theory to evidence in effort to preserve empiricality. This leads to facts that cannot be disentangled from philosophy. (p. 15) Vygotsky begins exploring autistic thought: Autism is egocentrism. Compare with Freud and the pleasure/reality principles as difference of autistic thought and realistic thought: Desires and satisfactions. (p. 18) Egocentric speech transforms into “inner speech”, which is highly important in later intellectual development. Practically, as communicative speech, ecocentric is useless, it does not communicate, but echoes itself like a chant. (p. 33)

Speech in developing children: Communication is bodily, much more than purely verbal. Specifically looking at toddlers, words strongly accompanied by gestures, etc. (p. 65) Thought, language and speech: The development of inner speech relates to development of social speech, which is a social means of thought. (p. 95)

Studying development of concepts. Take on category: Word denotes a collection, rather than individual concept. Several things arise: Complex, category, concept. (p. 115) Collections are grouped as “diffuse complexes”. Also arise pseudoconcepts, lies between a complex and a real concept. It is like a concept, but lacks the underlying ideas that define concepts as being more than just collections. (p. 119) The conceptual approach is what GOFAI projects tend to echo, but seem to miss the complex phase that must precede it.

Theories of learning scientific concepts: Interesting due to procedural model/simulation style of thought/reasoning. Some schools of thought believe that scientific concepts have no inward history, that they do not undergo development, but are absorbed via understanding and assimilation. Vygotsky claims that when new words are learned, they are seen as primitive generalizations, and then become replaced by higher types of generalizations. Scientific concepts specifically abide by a functional nature. This seems to echo comprehension of metaphors! (p. 149) Interesting note in childhood development: Failure to understand relations. Connections and relations between concepts arise gradually. Piaget cites Claparede’s law of awareness to explain establishment of relations: Awareness of difference precedes awareness of likeness (!). Connect with analogy, proves analogy is higher stage of development. (p. 163)

Types of understanding: personal/experiential vs schematic/scientific. Some concepts are spontaneously learned, derive from experience, but do not abide by shematic rules. Scientific concepts are learned as schematics, but do not connect to experience. “One might say that the development of the child’s spontaneous concepts proceeds upward, and the development of his scientific concepts downward, to a more elementary and concrete level.” So, spontaneous concepts gradually become generalized, while scientific concepts gradually become concrete. (p. 193) A critique of Gestalt psychology: cannot just use association. Must understand development of concepts as neither associative nor structural, but based on the relations of generality. This flows to the idea of productive thinking (Max Wertheimer), this involves analogy and generalizations of concepts on high order. (p. 204)

Vygotsky distinguishes analysis by elements to analysis by units. Units are capable of retaining and expressing the essence of the whole, as opposed to elements which are intrinsically fragmentary. The essence of word meaning, which develops over time, develops based on the thinker-knower, whose knowledge changes. Association theory is inadequate to account for these larger background changes. (p. 211-213)

“Inner speech is not the interior aspect of external speech–it is a function in itself. It still remains speech, i.e., thougth connected with words. But while in external speech thoguht is embodied in words, in inner speech words die as they bring forth thought. Inner speech is to a large extend thinking in pure meanings. It is a dynamic, shifting, unstable thing, fluttering between word and thought, the two more or less stable, more or less firmly dileneated components of verbal thought. Its true nature and place can be understood only after examining the next plane of verbal thought, the one still more inward than inner speech.” The plane of thought is a space of thinking which transcends thought and speech. Concepts formed here may not have expression in language. (p. 249) Speech and thought are manifestations of motivation, are connected to various theories of motivation. Compare with Maslow, The Sims, Facade, etc. (p. 252)

Overview

Metaphor and Thought is a collection of essays about metaphor. The book is primarily concerned with linguistics, but several essays trace back to the larger problem of understanding the role of metaphor in cognition. The general questions about metaphor are: How do people create and understand metaphors? How do we understand metaphors as linguistic structures? What is the relationship between metaphorical and literal speech? Is there such a thing as literal speech? The last question raises interesting concerns about the affect and use of language in communication.

Directions

Andrew Ortony: Metaphor: A Multidimensional Problem

Literal understanding and conception of meaning reached a height with Russel 1956 and Wittgenstein 1921/1961 and the rise of logical positivism. This is opposed to relativism and “mental construction” that arose with E Sapir 1921 and Whorf 1956. The latter asserts that types and uses of language are interdependent. (p. 1) Ortony distills questions down to distinguishing metaphors from nonmetaphors? “What are metaphors?” as well as a more interesting question, “What are metaphors for?” Max Black asserts that criterion for metaphorhood is inherently flawed. Something new is created when a metaphor is understood. What is that? (p. 5) In Development, new words are understood: “open” for both window and mouth. Is this the origin of embodiment in meaning? (p. 7)

Several widely asserted theories of metaphor: interaction view, comparison view, substitution view. Each equally compatible, incompatible w actual metaphor. (p. 10)

Max Black: More about Metaphor

This paper supplements the interaction view of metaphor. There is a mysterious, conventional nature of metaphor. It is not rationalist or literal certainly. “Say one thing and mean another” but why? (p. 21) There is a reductionist standard that the literal as norm, but metaphor is playful. Linguistically, metaphor violates some rules, but some must still be met to be acceptable. Can be no dictionary of metaphors, but there can be themes. Metaphors would be HARD in NLU. There are two categories of metaphors, emphatic and resonant. Emphatic is the tone and force of the metaphor, resonance is the allusion to other broader characteristics and qualities. A strong metaphor is both resonant and emphatic. (p. 26)

Black begins deriving a vaguely mathematical model of metaphors. “Every implication complex supported by a metaphor’s secondary subject, I now think, is a model of the ascriptions imputed to the primary subject: Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model.” (p. 31) Translation and metaphorical equivalence…

Jerrold M. Sadock: Figurative Speech and Linguistics

Problem of linguistics: Form vs meaning. Linguistics seeks to make explicit the relationship between them. This is not possible without understanding what sentences mean. (p. 52) Sadock introduces a mathematical notion of semantics. U_c(E)=>P is the utterance of E on some occasion c. Where P is a porposition that is implied or conveyed. Sadock introduces confidence in implication logic, forming some implicative logic system. (p. 59)

L. Jonathan Cohen: The Semantics of Metaphor

Discussion of metaphor and its relation to language. Is metaphor independent of language? What are the mechanics of metaphor? “analogical urge” Problem of langue vs parole. Cohen introduces a great many examples of metaphors and examines the possible meanings and complex relationships thereof. (p. 65) Cohen introduces a property attribution style of analysis. That is, some features are attributed, while others are canceled. (+update, +cylindircal, etc). Metaphor cancels some propositions. But enables, alludes to a larger set. This sounds like semantic networking. (p. 70)

David E. Rumelhart: Some Problems with the Notions of Literal Meanings

Rumelhart challenges the very notion of literal speech in this paper. Performing an analysis of Searle and Sadock, figurative language is integral to learning, it is intuitive and natural. The difference between figurative and “conventional” or literal language is very hazy, usually there is overlap of some kind. (p. 78) “The traditional program of semantic analysis (cf. Katz & Fodor) provides a set of meanings for the individual lexemes of the language and then provides a set of rules of composition whereby the individual meanings of the lexemes are combined to form the meaning of the sentence.” These combined lexemes form the literal meanings of sentences, and form the set of literal sentences. This approach is lacking due to the inflexibility of meaning. (p. 81) There are several approaches to addressing metaphor: 1) Reject the traditional program of semantics and forma new account of literal and conveyed meanings. 2) Retain traditional program, but assume metaphor and other cases of figurative are accountable by another theory altogether. 3) Assume traditional theory works fine for most cases, but additional processing is required for violations. 4) Modify traditional theory to make it work for metaphor as well as literal language. Sadock has opted for (3), and Cohen for (4), but Rumelhart asserts that neither are valid and whole theory must be torn down and reconstructed to account for metaphor. Dominant theories are suspect. Some interesting issues to follow: NLU and representation, psychological analysis of human understanding (accounting for figurative) (p. 82)

Metaphor depends on our background, real world understanding, does not rely on logical order of lexemes. Even literal sounding statements require context in order to be processed and understood correctly, since many details are ambiguous or possible to misinterpret. Spoken words are gnomon. (p. 84) A process oriented model of cognition: Evaluate, hypothesize, search. (Sounds like SOAR) (p. 87)

John R. Searle: Metaphor

George Miller’s mathematical/linguistic approach to metaphor. Uses first order logic formula of property attribution. (p. 110) Searle outlines 8 principles of metaphor using some of the propositional approach. (p. 116) Searle finally creates some helpful graphs of meanings, expressing specifically various types of metaphors and how they relate to sentence and utterance meanings; literal utterance, metaphorical utterance (simple), metaphorical utterance (open ended), ironical utterance, dead metaphor, and indirect speech act.

Samuel R. Levin: Standard Approaches and Literary Metaphors

Levin describes a mapping graph accounting for the metaphorical construction, between the linguistic and phenomenalistic constructural transformations. (p. 132)

Allan Paivio: Psychological Processes in the Comprehension of Metaphor

The question at the bottom here: Matter of why, not as workaround, but as integral portion of understanding. (p. 151) Skinner: generalization of stimulus-response; metaphor is related to “abstractive seeing” as visual imagery. (p. 156) Paivio examines dual coding of imagery and verbal associations, finding some sort approach to memory. Dual coding uses visual terms, but could be extended to embodiment in general. (p. 163)

George A. Miller: Images and Models, Similies and Metaphors

Miller starts by addressing comprehension issues, and addresses metaphor as an apperceptive problem. He claims that when we hear “x is y” then we must imagine a world in which x is y. This seems to be curious and flawed reasoning. (p. 213) Miller later extends Searle’s first order model of linguistics to one resembling lambda calculus. This resembles Cyc and other AI style modeling, using relational models. Several types of metaphors are examined using this approach, nominal metaphors, predicative metaphors, and sentenial metaphors. This forms some sort of peculiar replacement logic. (p. 231) Finally, Miller examines metaphor recognition as a functional interpretation of lexemes. This model may potentially have some helpful uses. (p. 239) This also uses a symbol-object view on literal terms and meanings. (p. 247)

Richard Boyd: Metaphor and Theory Change: What is “Metaphor” a Metaphor for?

Boyd here uses metaphor as an approach to examine theory. Different theories have their own languages, and employ metaphors in context and frame specific ways of expressing meaning. Metaphor applies to symbol representation in science, metaphors are constitutive of the theories that they express. Some examples, “thought is a kind of information processing, and the brain is a sort of computer”, or “certain motoric or cognitive processes are pre-programmed”, etc… (p. 360) Logical positivism claims that relevant qualities of objects are defined by sensation (phenomenological perception) rather than verbal description. (p. 366) Metaphor is bound up in the notion of reference, and it is necessary to define a theory of nondefinitional reference to deal with referentiality, ambiguity, and linguistic precision. (p. 377)

Boyd spends some time on how to approach a theory of reference: reference is an epistemological notion, since semantic theory is a branch of epistemology. “A causal theory of reference is true precisely because reference is an epistemological notion and causal theory of knowledge is true.” Reference must be thougth of as dynamic and dialectical (as opposed to synchronic, piecemeal, and nondialectical): Changes in language do not represent changes of reference. This becomes study of reference by means of “epistemic access”. (p. 381)

Overview

This text is a sociological approach to studying interactions. Its ostensible goal is to understand what sorts of interactions take place among people. The authors follow both Manford H. Kuhn and George Mead in the tradition of symbolic interaction. This work attempts to break down interactions and their dynamics into individuals, roles, identities, boundaries, and agenda. Their approach intends to be general, but has a tendency to focus on western subjects. The most promising finding of this work is the idea of the “role”, which seems to be very adaptable to a model of simulation.

Notes

Interaction is a base requirement for “humanness”. Begin looking at fundamental questions: Who, what, when, where, how, why. The focus of this research is on interactions from the perspective of the individual and not the larger social system. A point of conflict is scientism vs humanism, evidenced by western dualism. (p. 2) Rational thinking vs unconscious behavior: Strategic action is not necessarily conscious. Interesting source to look at: Manford H. Kuhn “Major Trends in Symbolic Interaction Theory in the Past Twenty-Five Years”. (p. 5) Some initial concepts: Role (Conformity, performance, improvisation), Self, Self Evaluation. (p. 6) On Self: Not reflexive, but directive. Each of these is heavily researched, as evidenced in the footnotes. Interpersonal school, self theory, exchange theory (economic model of self, allocation). “It is our view that the importance of the self lies not in its reflexive churnings and seethings but in its directive influence on human behavior.” (p. 8) Searching for an “interactionist” theory: Focusing on four dependent/effect variables: Who, why, when, where. Resembles dramatic framework of Kenneth Burke: Agent, Act, Scene, Agency (discussed in “Grammar of Motives”). This is not (supposedly) directly related, but seems relevant generally. (p. 12)

Stated task for work: Explain w’s for selection set: What actions may be empirically actualized? (p. 15) Even culture has preferred w’s to study or emulate, ideas of standard acceptable behaviors. It is important to identify and find how the subject domain is both limited and varied. (p. 24) Social boundaries and categories are ascribed and achieved. There are permeability of actions across boundaries, but these have biased permeability. Social group with higher power has freedom to transgress boundaries, but keep others out. (p. 27) Boundaries give way to an interaction-opportunity structure, model for interactions. Boundaries impede individuals, and have cost to cross. But there are perceived opportunities, so the cost and reward structure gives way to a game/economic dynamic. Knowing yields contextual knowledge of self-situation among others. One can be dissatisfied with one’s self-situation for knowledge of something better. (p. 37)

The bridge between mechanism and idealism: animal vs rational. Division between this is embarrassing and yeilds confusion, anxiety, ambivalence. It seems though, that this conflict seems more emblematic of western philosophy. The conflict of dual nature leads to a great deal of confusion and conflict, forcing man to make decisions without knowing consequences, which lies at the base of tragedy and comedy. Reality is shared in social system, and constructed through interaction. “Reality, then, in this distinctively human world, is not a hard immutable thing but is fragile and adjuciated–a thing to be debated, compromised, and legislated.” (p. 42)

A look at Mead’s theory of social acts and social objects: Any act consists of an impulse, stimulus, and response. The thing (stimulus) becomes an object by being enacted. This is a special and somewhat unconventional use of language that looks at actions and behavior in an insightful way. (p. 50) Identity is the set of perspectives and attitudes on the acting self. It appraises, evaluates, and monitors. Another take on action is dramaturgy (Goffman, Burke), which breaks things down to character, role, and audience. The self is a performance. (p. 57)

A step by step study of planning and interactions: 1) Man is a planning animal. 2) Things take on meanings in relation to plans. 3) We act toward things in terms of their meaning for our plan of action. 4) Therefore, we must identify every thing we encounter and discover its meaning. 5) For social plans of action, these meanings must be consensual. 6) The basic thing to be identified in any situation is the person himself. [Character] Symbolic interaction links things and objects. (p. 60-62)

Role identities and daydreams: Rehearsal for performances. Similar to goal based planning, but seems intrinsically different. A role identity is an imagined suite of devices for one in a particular social position. It’s a view of oneself as one would like to think of oneself being and acting as an occupant of that position. Roles are highly abstract constructs, and most are imaginary or unrealized. Roles must be shared and consensual to be accepted socially. This is done via performances, one performs a role, so it is reciprocated and supported by others. There is a balance between conventional and idiosyncratic performances (latter occurring within one’s “inner forum”). (p. 70) Roles must have audiences to be legitimized. This is role support. Audience is specific to role itself. Without role support, legitimacy, actuality of role decays over time, leading to an undermining of identity (which seems to be a trend in postmodernism). (p. 75)

Roles are separated, operate and parallel. The cluster, but clusters may be conflicted and dissociated. Roles operate in a heirarchy of prominence. Each role grants its performer various extrinsic and intrinsic rewards or gratifications. Most of these come from others (the audience) via the support and performance. (p. 77) Some interesting issues emerge from this flow: What of undesired roles? “drunk”, “failure”, or performances that may be interpreted poorly by different audience members. Ie, whining could produce either sympathy or loathing. There is a strata of actualization: “writer” vs “writer wannabe” which seems to occur as a spectrum of how roles are perceived by different audiences. Role prominence strongly informs decision making. (p. 83) Value and satisfaction planning model: Important is the notion of perceived opportunities. This seems to be treading dangerously close to goal and planning oriented AI and such thinking. (p. 85)

Context works in application to evaluation of performance self. The audience/self expectation and appraisal must sacrifice some expectations to fulfill others. There is a difference between the real and idealized self/performer. (p. 93) Legitimization is only necessary when a discrepancy is large or frequent. A discrepancy is a difference between expected role-identity support and actualized support. Reconciliation patterns are: Selective perception (dismiss some discrepancies, impose a border between noise and intention in performance), Selective interpretation (reinterpretation of the audience’s response), Rationalization (explaining away discrepancies, as arising from unimportant or external causes), Scapegoating (blaming another for the failure, due to their failure in counterroles), Deprecation of audience (the audience does not understand the role and its opinions are of no merit), Disavowal (the performance with discrepancy is not relevant to role identity). These patterns of justification are interesting in their nature of human rationalization and cognitive dissonance. (p. 95-99)

Selective and functional understanding of things [images of objects], interpretation and being interpreted, are active processes. Perception and recoding resembles semiotic analysis. (p. 107) There are culturally relevant means of perception. Perception is a learned contextualized cultural skill. Reflection on Nouveau Riche as matter of cultural perception of goods and tastes. (p. 111) Stereotyping is a means of generalizing, it simplifies individuals/things into categories. A category is characteristic, it has properties, but it is also functional. Stereotypes are relevant to different groups in their functional characteristics: compare stereotype of policeman to square vs hippie. Stereotyping; “It is an inherent and inevitable aspect of every human appraisal of every person encountered.” (p. 115) Stereotype and reputation. Stereotype: social identity, Reputation: personal identity. SOUNDS LIKE GURPS!!! Status/Reputation. Both shape and mold each other. (p. 117)

Knowledge of others is flawed. We cannot truly (metaphysically) know someone, but there is a minimum necessary to do so. There is a wide chasm between minimum and complete. The authors define some processes in which perceptions are formed and reinforced. This turns to reinforcing cycles (p. 123):

1. Ego makes an inference about Alter.
2. Ego acts toward Alter in terms of this inference.
3. Alter makes inferences about Ego in terms of his action.
4. Alter tends to react toward Ego in terms of his inference.
5. Thus Ego’s influences tend to be confirmed by Alter’s actions.

There are a multitude of situations under which interactions may occur. Under conflict [collision] some protocol must be established. Conflict is conflict between role identities, which one must be used in a given circumstance. This must be resolved seamlessly, hence the use of ritual. (p. 129) Roles are perceived in people. People perform a line of action (as in Goffman). The goal is to discern motives. Different groups understand actions to indicate motives in varying senses. Motives are deduced via projection of self onto others’ roles. This approach is totally different from the standard model of communication, which is transmission of ideas, this approach is much more internal, wherein agents attempt to discern motives (or the role they would desire Ego to have) of others and react accordingly. (p. 132) Roles are negotiated and determined via a working agreement between interactors. This cycle defines roles for both parties, via interpretaive and presentative processes. There is a neat graph on this page of the dynamics of interactions. “A working agreement can be said to exist when the cognitive processes of one person, with respect to social identities are not in gross conflict with the expressive process of the other person.” (p. 142). Example of this sort of dynamic occurs when a man and woman are wavering between being friends and more than friends, roles are presented, cast, altercast, responded to, etc.

Role of power in interactions: occurs when imbalance of “resources” that is, gratification of tasks [interactions]. An “operator” is one who uses and manipulates others knowing the rules of social exchange. (p. 160) Some types of multi-person encounters: 1) conflict of roles, 2) simultaneous performances, 3) central performances. In these, roles and interactions are performed and negotiated, have a tendency to drift towards a low energy states (break off into single interactions, where there aren’t conflicts). (p. 162)

Features that drive interpersonal relationships: Reward dependability, Ascription, Commitment, Investment, Attachment. These features also relate to relationship formation. The model here is an economic one, balancing various features rewards for other qualities. (p. 170) Some sentimental characteristics of relationships [perceived in eyes of agents]: Uniqueness, Intimacy, Consecration, Purity of Reciprocity. These are qualities that agents see in their relationship that makes it special. (p. 177) Some juicy bits here: How relationships are formed: Initiation of relationships, first encounters, selection of role or persona[s] for such encounters. Subset of personas may be applied, but how big a subset? (p. 181) Concealment of roles in relationships: Some roles may be hidden or concealed. Sometimes these slip up. Some relationships need or depend on limitation of roles/personas. This leads to covertness and multiplication of identity. May be simple or serious: A poet in a workaday environment, vs a homosexual in a strained marriage. (p. 191)

Roles are learned, anticipatory socialization in development. Children “play at” roles. Play relates to role learning, seems to relate to concept formation as well (inasmuch as roles are concepts). Denaturalization vs system learning as roles and performances. (p. 210) Role identities are observed, fantasized, then change or evolve and are made more realistic. Being vs Being Like. Relates to changes in perception, as perceptions grow and evolve over development and over time in general (Connect Vygotsky.) Are roles changed or destroyed or recreated? (p. 215)

In logistics of identity, there is an economic model of what roles to perform based on the relative rewards to be gained vs costs of performance. Relative worth of actions from different roles, gratifications are highly relative. The economic model here must be stochastic. Interesting things happen when individuals overestimate, or underestimate roles and costs. (p. 238) Agenda construction and negotiation of relationships: there are scales and scopes of agendas, long and short. Relationship between them is problematic, when is an agenda short term vs long term? (p. 246)

The authors seem to have used some survey questions to elicit data from respondents. The effectiveness is curious, but there is a nice distribution of questions: 1) Average past degree of self-support. 2) Average past degree of social support. 3) Average past degree of intrinsic gratification. 4) Average past degree of extrinsic gratification. 5) Average past degree of commitment. 6) Average past degree of investment. Each question could be applied to various abstracted roles. (p. 265)

Overview

Weizenbaum’s 1976 influential text reflects a growing concern over the philosophical ramifications of artificial intelligence. Weizenbaum is specifically concerned with the interpretation of his Eliza program, and its characteristic of its simplistic processing being mistaken for the wisdom of an actual human psychotherapist. Weizenbaum argues that this is indicative of a larger problem, wherein the application of science and technology (and computer science specifically) is reducing humans to be equated to machines. Weizenbaum argues against the development of AI, not because AI cannot achieve its goals, but because AI should not achieve its goals.

Notes

The computer is a vehicle that is making the world into a computer. Weizenbaum’s initial concern seems very similar to Hidegger’s question concerning technology. Weizenbaum also interacted with Daniel Denett in fleshing out his ideas.

Eliza is not embodied but begins with cultural conceptual knowledge. (at least pretends to have such knowledge). Weizenbaum’s schocks on public reception of Eliza: 1) Model of therapy (that could be made artificial) 2) Antropomorphization of computer. 3) Over crediting of limited text processing power. (p. 5)

Weizenbaum’s concerns and questions: 1) Man as recognized as/equated to clockwork. 2) Role of instrumentality (Freud ref about man being how like a god with his prosthetic). 3) Human trust and autonomy (machines diminish autonomy with dependence). What is the retrospective modern audience take on these? (pp. 8-9) Weizenbaum sees a dogmatic, rationalist perspective seen in colleagues and students. These cultural embedded perceptions persist to this day. (p. 10)

Consider Judaic tradition of the contract between God and man. Depends on free action, decision making of both parties. With rationalistic perspective, truth is equated to provability. Science is a drug and slow acting poison. (p. 12)

Behaviorist ref to B.F. Skinner: human values are illusory. Consider comparison to embedded nature of value in linguistic/semiotic systems. (p. 14) Weizenbaum introduces theatre as a school “The Greek and Oriental theatres, the Shakespearian stage, the stages peopled by the Ibsens and Checkhovs nearer to our day–these were schools. The curricula they taught were vehicles for understanding the societies they represented.” Weizenbaum is looking at this from a cultural study perspective. (p. 16)

Weizenbaum discusses tools, as extensions of people. Tools are imaginative extensions, but limited by imagination. Tool informs and alters user’s perception of world. (p. 18) The computer has closed some doors while it opened others. Weizenbaum’s fear of computer as a tool is technological determinist in nature. Technology changes people who use it. People have become over-confident in the computer’s ability to solve problems, and under-confident in themselves. (p. 38)

Weizenbaum discusses power of machines as regular, lawful entities. “Machines, when they operate properly, are not merely law abiding; they are embodiments of law.” We have faith of the law in the computer. We defer our laws and knowledge to the law of the computer. (p. 40) Uses logic of games to describe state and rules in systems. Weizenbaum uses some abstract examples- greed is not a rule, but implicit law embedded in Monopoly. Other games may be more abstract, but still encode rules and embody laws. (p. 44)

Some complexity theory here: also, matter of translatability of X into an algorithm for representing X. Translatability is directly related to simulation. This relates to notion of a formal description “effective procedure”, but glosses over ideas of subtext or nuance. “Can anything we may wish to do be described in terms of an effective procedure”: No (p. 65) Natural langauge encodes grammatical validity (p. 69)

Baudrillard ref here: Representation is equated to the subject. Semiotic simulation implies that boundary between is blurred. (p. 106) Process of programming, defining a model is two-sided: writing/programming reveals flaws in our logic, we cannot conceal them via ambiguity as in natural language. Programming may also be used to explore ideas and come to understand a subject. (p. 108)

Computers are physically embodied, but playing at ideas in a purely cognitive realm. Computer does not understand what it is doing. The underlying references of the reason are lost on it. (p. 112) The solitary power of the lone programmer: Comparison to compulsive gambling is reminiscent of Alison Adam’s discussion of male programmer mating with female program. “The computer programmer, however, is a creator of universes for which he alone is the lawgiver. So, of course, is the designer of any game. But universes of unlimited complexity can be created in the form of computer programs. Moreover, and this is a crucial point, systems so formulated and elaborated act out their programmed scripts. They compliantly obey their laws and vividly exhibit their obedient behavior. No playwright, no stage director, no emperor, however powerful, has ever exercised such absolute authority to arrange a stage or a field of battle and to command such unswervingly dutiful actors or troops.” (p. 115)

Weizenbaum derives a slick comparison between the compulsive programmer and the compulsive gambler. Both blind themselves to realistic laws and prefer to live in their own artificial domains. (p. 124-125)

Weizenbaum explores the ambitions of the AI project, namely to extend and handle any problem that could be solved by a human. At least, AI should be “nothing less than to build a machine whose linguistic behavior, to say the least, is to be equivalent to that of humans.” (p. 138)

Wezenbaum explores the differences between theories and models. Theory is limited to the textual nature of the theory. Models may be said to satisfy theories. Computers enable alternate linguistic expression of theory via programming. (p. 144) Computer models enable immediacy and response in validation of theory, but also let pass the indeterminability of false premises, and concealment of fault. (p. 152)

AI attempts to replicate how people solve problems. Huristics and problem solving methods are protocols for understanding subjects to be modeled. Can reduce all problems to be approached by one possibly faulty model. This is description of Newell and Simon’s work, which we know is somewhat gender biased (more about how young male college students solve problems). (p. 169) Behaviorist model treats human model as a black box. Skinner refuses to look inside the black box, whereas the AI theory sees the inside of the black box as a computer to be replicated. (p. 175)

The transformation of problems into technical ones: the application of FPS machine and objective treatment on human subjects. (p. 180) The method of scripting the interactor to some extent preps and pre-programs human interactor. Compare with Alice chatterbot movement (p. 188)

AI has: confusion of intelligence with IQ, and the neglect of other modes of intelligence. (p. 205) Sum here is a deeper emphasis on the depth of human knowledge and the extreme limitation of the computer. The limits of computers should be thought in terms of “Oughts”. (p. 226)

Most successful programs are built on heuristics, not theory. This is notable in application of games such as SimCity, Sims, etc. Computer programs are based on strategies that seem to work under most unforeseen circumstances, as opposed to strong theory. (p. 232) The capacity of the computer through closed-ness can re-create history. Like Baudrillard, but applied. When computer is applied to war, it introduces tremendous dehumanization and distance between ones making decisions and the ones in battle. Weizenbaum implicates computer as device which lead to terrible waste of life and destruction in Vietnam. (p. 239) Common viewpoint holds persistent confidence and sense of inevitability of machines. Professor J. W. Forrester: Our social systems are no utopias. (p. 247)

Weizenbaum argues: “But I argue that rationality may not be separated from intuition and feeling. I argue for the rational use of science and technology, not for its mystification, let alone abandonment. I urge the introduction of ethical thought into science planning. I combat the imperialism of instrumental reason, not reason.” (p. 256)

What is a human voluntary act? Is voluntary nature illusory? Machines cannot be voluntary since they follow rules, but what is human voluntary process? If we believe Herbert Simon, we are non-voluntary, merely reacting to our environments. (p. 260) “An individual is dehumanized whenever he is treated as less than a whole person.” But, how would it be possible to treate someone as whole? Through technology or otherwise? (p. 266) Final ought of computer science projects: “… there are some human functions for which computers ought not to be substituted. It has nothing to do with what computers can or cannot be made to do. Respect, understanding, and love are not technical problems.”

Overview

Adam explores Artificial Intelligence from a feminist perspective and critiques current AI projects as being heavily masculinist. She surveys the field of AI paying close attention to its history and its various developments and how the gradual growth of the field has come to reinforce this highly gendered perspective. The danger in the male dominated growth of AI is that the AI project attempts to capture human reason, and through the neglect of feminist perspective, the reflection of humanity that AI provides is very lacking. Adam also critiques the process and approach of AI, exposing some of its flaws as a representative system.

Notes

The key word in the application of masculinist ideology into AI is inscription: AI is inscribed with gender, and it must be read to be revealed. (p. 11) AI has a culture that is in conflict over certain issues: science vs engineering, cognitive vs computer science. AI is virtual: study of non-physical objects. Artifacts are non-present.

Keith Grint and Rosalind Gill 1995: Feminist analyses exist between serving masculinity and technology vs acknowledging the force of masculinity and patriarchy. Studies which assume terms of masculinity and patriarchy without explanation tend to essentialist claims. (p. 17) Pushing women into technology indicates sexual politics: assumes neutrality of institutions (p. 19) Exploring gender as female implies that male is norm: masculinity is neutral while gender is socially constructed. Harraway: Sex and gender are a complicated systems. (p. 22)

AI is inscribed with gender. AI concerned with knowledge and simulation of knowledge. Subject of knowledge teeters between visible and invisible. The subject is the one who actually knows and is doing the knowing, which is usually omitted from AI study, usually assumed as male standard. (p. 29) Nagel 1986 critiques epistemology and propositional knowledge: “view from nowhere”. In propositional logic (S knows p) ‘S’ is universal and perspectiveless. Gilbert Ryle 1963: Knowing what vs knowing how. (p. 30) WWK or Women’s Ways of Knowing contrasts with women’s epistemology, but forms an essentialist text.

Adam reviews AI in the context of its development. There is still the persistent perception of AI as creating artificial minds, fraught with conflicts of thinking vs doing, building vs understanding. The history here focuses on the original tasks of AI. (p. 34) The underlying tools used to build AI are: search, predicate logic, decision making, heuristics, state traversal, “bounded rationality”, and planning. These approaches relate to work done by researchers in the 1950s, and excludes affairs that might be taken up by women. It was not a deliberate choice to venerate male reason, but rather it was the natural choice for researchers. (p. 36)

AI is about framing: symbolic AI interlinks with Saussure’s semiotics. Investigate Zenon Pylyshyn’s “Computation and Cognition”: work supporting GOFAI (p. 38) Representational knowledge frames employ real world– or interpretation of it. Knowledge vs stereotype. AI confuses representation of simplified model with real world that supposedly informs model.

Adam investigates connectionist networks (neural networks) as opposed to symbolic systems. These seem less ideologically steeped in male reasoning, but still depend on simulation, and still must be told what to do. (p. 45)

Adam reviews philosophical critiques (and other critiques of AI. She is very careful to do so in context and focus of what AI is and is trying to accomplish. AI can never be framed as a philosophical test. (p. 48) Searle critiques AI on basis of “intentionality”, which is some sort of human response (Chinese Room). Dennett critiques this argument based on total impossibility/implausibility of argument. (pp. 51-52) Dennett: computer acts as an intentional way insofar as it may be interpreted to do so. Phenomenological critique of AI: Dreyfus: computer cannot know how. Rule following leads to infinite regress, depends on “what we are”. This is one perspective that can be linked to the feminist critique without too much extension. (p. 55)

AI issues are: representation, intentionality, agency, and culture.

Finding the knowing subject/ knower in Cyc and Soar against a universalist perspectiveless viewpoint. Losing the knower preserves the conservative masculine “normality” and deflects responsibility. Knowing implies Responsibility! Considering traditional epistemologies: * implicit individualism, * absence of identity, * non-wierdness, * cultural imperialism. (p. 70) Subjective knowledge and consistency: Weirdness is non-beholden to standards in masculinist perception (ie, white, middle class, rational, academic culture) (p. 74)

Working from feminist epistemology: The anonymity of the inventor/scientist promotes technological imperialism “a technology appears”. Critiques great man theory, but grants anonymity of the author, who is given additional power through implicit assumption that technology is natural development. The subject “we” must be enacted, not given. (p. 77) Self knowledge and awareness demands a cultural/contextual knowledge/awareness. (p. 78) Responsibility and judgment: knower as participant vs total objectivity. Classical idealized knower is objective and detached, external to the world’s history: forms AI’s development as rooted in classical epistemology. Responsibility of agents (moral agents) is autonomous or by design?

Cyc project: Implies universality of subjects. Knowledge held is supposed to be common to everyone. Compare subject of Cyc with (for example) Wikipedia. How does Cyc cope with beliefs? Are beliefs necessary? How are they different from common sense? Mary Hesse: Observations themselves are mediated by other theories. (p. 85) Assumes universality, common denomination for decisions. Cyc implies authority, non-subjective nature. Implies normality: “healthy, sane, non-babies” who decides health and sanity? (p. 90)

Soar built from GPS (generalized problem solver). Soar meant as a candidate for a “unified theory of cognition”. The problem still is that it is a view from somewhere- that being male college students, aiming for “unnatural” problems. (p. 94)

Critique of objective reasoning: There should be plurality of voice in problem solving, a sharing of responsibility. Compare the independent Cartesian man of Reason with collectivist responsibility. (p. 98)

Language and AI: There is a symbolic order of language. Derrida identifies three isms in symbol-value systems relating to rationalist take on world: Logocentrism (supremacy of spoken word), Phallocentrism: “denotes a unitary drive toward a single, ostensibly reachable goal” (Tong 1994. p222), Dualism: way everything framed as binary oppositions. (p. 107) Knowing how vs knowing that underlies phenomenology. Knowing is inseparable from being. Attempting to separate them is Cyc’s failure: reduces the state of being into “somatic primitives” (p. 115) Focus of Cyc is knowledge, focus of Soar is architecture. In both, poor choice of problem leads to faulty theory. (p. 127)

Concerning embodiment, can assent with Andy Clark. Rationalist view denies the body. (p. 129) Lakoff critiques the objectivist perspective of AI and computation. The stance of experientialism wants to know why human conceptual system is why it is. The mind as machine perspective cannot cope with the manner in which different conceptual systems are organized: these assume equivalence occurs when one system may be translated into another. (p. 133) in Embodiment and A-Life: control is still limited by behaviorist notions of importance. Helmreich 1994 explores the subtext of A-Life: as an attempt to create life in-silico. Works like creation stories wherein masculine god (aka male programmer), breathes life into female program to create digital life. (p. 152) A-Life situation still has an absence of real human need or meaning, and an absence of social situatedness for populace of environments. Usually evolutionary programs/robots are aimed at competition, mating, creating some sort of economy or trade, but do not have any fun. These societies tend to be developed on basis of fitness and competition, and do not represent the larger social situation. (p. 154)

Adam questions what form a feminist AI project might have. Would it look any different? Built with the classical masculinist tools, could it work any differently? How could feminist programmers radically subvert AI? Ref to Mulvey and Film? (p. 157) The depth and personal situation in language and behavior is deep in human interaction. How to express reception or expectation or understanding, ambiguity or subtlety in AI or in simulated world? These are still lacking even from projects such as The Sims. (p. 162)

A distressing image here: Helmreich cites Hayles: “A male programmer mating with a female program to create a progeny whose biomorphic diversity surpasses the father’s imagination.” Adam continues: “The desires are to make the body obsolete, to play god in artificial worlds, and to download minds into robots. Such desires are predicated on the assumption that if a machine contains the contents of a person’s mind then it is that person. The body does not matter; it can be left behind.”