Juul’s thesis is that games are a combination of real rules with fictional context. His primary focus of study is videogames specifically. As a self described ludologist, Juul is primarily concerned with the aesthetics of rule based systems on their own, and the larger acceptance of free standing game studies as a viable academic discipline. The first prerogative in this agenda is to define games as the field of study. Juul defines games with the following bullet points (p. 7):

1. A game is a rule based system.
2. It has variable and quantifiable outcomes.
3. Different outcomes are assigned different values.
4. The player exerts effort in order to influence the outcome.
5. The player feels emotionally attached to the outcome.
6. The consequences of the activity are optional and negotiable.

This set of six qualifiers characterizes the medium, the compositional substance of games. Juul’s perception is simultaneously broad, but also narrow. The focus is to distinguish that which separates games from non-games. The chief element of this definition is on the outcome of the game, but various “game-like” activities have ambiguous outcomes. A chief example of this is with role-playing games. There is a large collection of borderline cases which are discussed later.

One of the central elements in Juul’s book is the conflict between rules and fiction. Juul poses the argument, which he immediately refutes, that fiction is unimportant because it is incidental to a game. This reverberates with the larger ludology/narratology conflict. One issue I that seems to be missed here is that rules themselves have procedural, and therefore representational elements. If cognitive science has taught us anything, it is that the human mind does not work using abstract symbols, but rather association. Rules and causality may be associative like anything else. This argument does not put forward the idea that meaning in games is narrative in nature, though.

Juul explains the paradoxical nature of rules, play, and fun. Games are somewhat self contradictory because of their reliance on free form play and concrete rules. The restriction created by rules brings meaning to the actions and outcomes in the game world. “The rules of a game add meaning and enable actions by setting up differences between potential moves and events.” (p. 19) This distinction is very relevant in comparison to role-playing games, which use the rules themselves to make the world more credible. Rules legitimize actions, bestowing meaning upon play, which would otherwise just be chaos.

There is a conflicted relationship between games and art. This has to do with the role of emotions within games. “Video games generally focus on manipulating and moving objects, and less commonly address the more complex interactions between humans such as friendships, love, and deceit. We can suggest many reasons why this is so–we can blame unimaginative game designers; we can blame a conservative game audience; we can blame a ris-dverse game industry; and finally we can look at game design and see that the game form lends itself more easily to some things than to others–it is hard to create a game about emotions because emotions are hard to implement in rules.” (p. 20)

I would actually posit a slightly different argument. Juul is saying that emotions are hard to implement as rules, which suggests that emotions could be unambiguously modeled. This suggests that emotional states would be manipulated like any other token in the game mechanics. I would argue instead that it is hard for emotion to clearly emerge from rules. The formulas for a love story or a horror movie are not without structure. Given structure alone, players cannot get emotion, because emotion arises from human experience. What is required instead is for rules to be represented in a way that reflects human experience. Games do reflect human experience and they do generate emotion, but the range of emotions that they reliably represent and evoke (anger, fear, joy) is only a small sliver of the human emotional spectrum.

Video Games and the Classic Game Model

Juul is interested in defining a model of games. The reason for this is that a model can be tested. Once laid out, it is a discursive object. A model can be used to identify boundaries and borderline cases. A model is also a productive set. Given a model of games, one can attempt create games that push the boundaries of that model in interesting ways.

The six features of games as described earlier are to be seen as necessities. Juul argues that they should fall along the lines of conditions that are necessary and sufficient, as opposed to dimensions of games. Things such as The Sims and tabletop roleplaying are borderline cases. An example of the game spectrum can be seen on (p. 44)

On transmediation of games: Adaptations must accomodate rules and state. Only discussed here are games falling within the frame of the classic model. This makes sense for examples such as the equivalence of a particular number game with tic-tac-toe, but is not really viable for adaptations that involve setting.  Adaptations in role-playing games are ample enough for a full study on their own. For example, D&D referencing Lord of the Rings, also various board and card games, and of course, RPG game settings. Neglected also in the discussion is experience. The experience of playing the number game is dramatically different from the experience of playing tic-tac-toe.

In a general sense, Maslow is important in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, Maslow is important for understanding and modeling human behavior, and for juxtaposition against the Sims, whose representation of behavior comes straight from Maslow.

Elements of a Psychological Approach to Science

Early in his introduction, Maslow criticizes a disembodied and objective theory of science and psychology. He frames science as a pursuit of certain needs, specifically to understand. He emphasizes the role of values within science. It is especially important to understand the values and psychology behind the study of science, to understand the scientists themselves. Maslow’s subtle concern is that scientific values themselves might contaminate science itself. “It should reassure the uneasy pure scientist to know that the point of all this disquieting talk about values is to achieve more efficiently his goal, i.e., the improvement of our knowledge of nature, the decontamination of our knowledge of the known by study of the knower.” (p. 8)

What is interesting here is Maslow’s broad understanding and inclusiveness in science. Also significant is the defense of non-scientists. Ties into generalization and the destressing of method. We should focus instead on values. One of Maslow’s points is to encourage the aesthetic and humanistic values within science.

Problem Centering versus Means Centering in Science

The overview of this section is criticism of the means centered scientific approach. Means centering is the practice of focusing scientific inquiry around certain means, rather than centering on broader problems. Means centering tends to create an orthodoxy where new questions are not asked. I don’t think this is a criticism of the scientific method exactly, but rather its application and use, where only one technique is used for conducting experiements, for example: stimulus and response methods in psychology.

Holistic-Dynamic Theory in the Study of Personality

Maslow is interested in an approach to psychology different from the current approaches in use. The opening of this section is critical of the idea that there is soem discrete datum that may be isolated and studied in psychology. The idea of reducing individuals to collections of discrete elements that may be studied in isolation (eg, behaviorism) is a reductive-analytic approach. An alternative is to study the whole, which is a holistic approach. This comes in two flavors. Holistic-analytic is flawed because it still has an atomistic and static viewpoint. In this perspective, the subject being studied is essentially a passive target. Maslow’s emphasis is on a holistic-dynamic approach which treats the subject as having a more active role.

Preface to Motivation Theory

This section is made up of 16 principles foundational to motivation theory.

1. The individual is a whole, indivisible.
2. Hunger is a reasonable base of study for motivation.
3. Desires are merely means to ends, rather than ends in of themselves.
4. Desires can be satisfied according to a culture. Maslow’s argument here does not account for different cultures having different intrinsic needs, but rather that the means for satisfaction (of esteem for example) might vary. The claim is that the needs are universal.
5. Desires may express multiple motivations. A desire for sex might merely represent a biological urge, but it might also represent a need for love or esteem.
6. An individual’s state affects motivation, and is affected in turn.
7. Motivations preclude others. Motivations are never ending.
8. To list all drives is a fallacy. The idea of doing so implies that drives are equal and independent.
9. Should focus on motivation and needs rather than behavior alone.
10. Animal instinct is different from human drives, which require learned behavior.
11. Environmental basis is at odds with motivation. Behavior theory needs situation theory in order to make sense.
12. Occasionally, the organism is not whole, but disjointed when in a stressed state.
13. Motivations relate to achievable goals.
14. Role of impulses (Freud’s id) is unknown.
15. Motivation should be studied in healthy people.

A Theory of Human Motivation

This chapter is about the famous heirarchy of needs. At the base are physiological needs, which are unusual because of their atomicity. Basic needs are atomic because the need for a certain salt concentration in the bloodstream is entirely separate from the need for a certain concentration of sugar. Classic examples of basic needs are breathing and hunger. The point of physiological needs is that they are prepotent, taking priority over others. It is notable that, as described, hunger as described is very different from appetite, but rather an urgent and terrible need for sustenance.

Above physiology is safety and then belongingness, esteem, and self-actualization. It is still important to understand these needs in terms of their potential absence. There is a strong differentiation between higher and lower needs, especially basic needs. When lower needs are unfulfilled, or frustrated, the higher needs lose value. It is suggested that while needs form a definite heirarchy, their tradeoffs are somewhat complex, and relate to health and accustomization. If higher needs are frustrated, then lower needs are taken for granted. Satisfaction of needs leads to overall health, and each level of satisfied needs is a level of mental health.

Maslow renders his model as a system of percentage scales of needs, where if one need is satisfied, another emerges, and all needs decay at certain rates.

If one need is satisfied, then another emerges. This statement might give the false impression that a need must be satisfied 100 percent before the next need emerges. In actual fact, most members of our society who are nomal are partially satisfied in all their basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same time. A more realistic description of the hierarchy would be in terms of decreasing percentages of satisfaction as we go up the hierarchy of prepotency. For instance, if I may assign arbitrary figures for the sake of illustration, it is as if the average citizen is satisfied perhaps 85 percent in his physiological needs, 70 percent in his safety needs, 50 percent in his love needs, 40 percent in his self-esteem needs, and 10 percent in his self-actualization needs. (p. 100-101)

This is not preciesly the same model, but the description given here has dramatic resemblance to needs in The Sims.

Higher and Lower Needs

An interesting point here is on the issue of ethics. Referencing Plato’s diverging horses, Maslow instead asserts that higher needs are themselves horses. Motivation theory does away with the sort of moral quandary that involves dissociated and diverging elements of identity.

The Expressive Component of Behavior

Motivation theory is at odds with expression. If every individual is fraught with needs that require satisfaction, expression is much less important. Maslow presents a possibility that expression might be a need, but if that were the case, then it would definitionally not be expression. He continues to explain a difference between expressive and coping behaviors. Coping is a motivated behavior, while expression is not. He explains a suite of differences between the two, but not really why expression occurs. The suggestion seems to be that expression is manifested in need gratification, in the absence of frustration. So if needs are not frustrated, then the approaches to gratify those needs may be expressive.

Overview

Clark’s work serves several goals. The first of which is a review of contemporary Artificial Intelligence as applied to robotics and neuroscience. Clark’s second goal is a critique of traditional symbolic AI and the notion of disembodied reasoning that pervades it. The brain, body, and world all tie together in a densely connected network that is impossible to untangle. Thinking and learning are strongly rooted in the mechanics of the body and world. These systems are adaptive and pattern based, not symbolic. Clark specifically criticizes projects such as Cyc, which attempt to build a filing-cabinet model of the world by extensively cataloging each relation and bit of information.

One of Clark’s first examples of embodied reasoning is the cockroach, which is an efficient and well adapted creature, and has a bare minimum of computational reasoning in its tiny brain. This computation is directly tuned to the roach’s physical environment.

Notes

Clark critiques the use of symbolic reasoning in towards the application of embodied problems. In relation to a simulated world, where everything is symbolic, the situation gets rather hairy. Clark’s preferred approach may be to avoid simulation entirely, but that is not an option here. Nonetheless, he has several points of merit that are applicable in the simulation of systems.

Clark repeatedly emphasizes that creature behavior evolves in relation to the physical environment as well as its physical body. Brains are messy systems that leverage as much as they can off surroundings and affordances. They are not planned, but are highly adaptive and responsive systems.

With this in consideration, it should stand to reason that the most successful AI simulations of people are ones in which the characters leverage their environment as much as possible. The Sims leaps immediately to mind, since most real logic is represented in the objects in the environment as opposed to in the Sims themselves.

Overview

This book gives an overview of translation studies. According to Bassnett, it is a relatively new field which has received very little formal recognition (nor respect either) until fairly recently. The book attempts to introduce the reader very quickly into the scope of depth, nuance, and complexity caused by the dilemmas of translation. Bassnet is concerned primarily with developing a postcolonial understanding of translation, freed from notions of dependencies and hierarchy. Also discussed is the role of translation in history and varying theories of what is important in a translation, and whether translatability is possible at all. Little attention is paid to adaptation, but the theories of translation discussed are fairly applicable.

Notes

Translation studies serves to assemble a fragmentary world. It enables a nomadic navigation of sources, the translator connects language and ways of life. (p. 1) There is a joint portrayal (in the 1990s) of the translator as a force for good vs. a suspect. The image of the latter seeks to impose power relations through textual production and access. Postcolonial translation study encourages an equal relationship between the author and translator, greatly elevating the translator as a respected contributor to a text. (p. 4) Translation may be seen as a transaction between texts and cultures. This is between space; carrying the burden of meaning of a culture. Cited from Homi Bhabha. A set of studies called “polysystems theory” developed by Itamar Even-Zohar and Gideon Toury shifted to a process/system oriented understanding of texts and culture. Translation is not only a communication, but a continuation of a text through time. (p. 6) Sherry Simon claims that language does not merely mirror reality, but shapes it; and translation aids in that shaping. Translation studies must challenge ideas of what happens when a text is moved between languages. (p. 10)

Translation studies begins to differ in its interpretations as a product vs a process. The classic feudal metaphor (of the SL) is consistent with colonialism. “There are two positions, one establishing a hierarchical relationship in which the SL author acts as a feudal overloard exacting fealty from the translator, the other establishing a hierarchical relationship in which the translator is absolved of all responsibility of the SL text are both quite consistent with the growth of colonial imperialism in the nineteenth century.” (p. 13)

Bassnett discusses J.C. Catford’s 1965 study on untranslatability. He distinguishes translation and transference. Translation consists of substitution of SL meanings for TL meanings, where in transference, SL meanings are implanted into the TL text. This is a distinctly semiotic take on the situation. We can look at Jakobson and J. Levy for references on this?

Categories of translation studies: 1) History of Translation; 2) Translation in TL culture; 3) Translation and Linguistics; 4) Translation and Poetics. Translation has the burden of evaluation carried with it. Value judgments are implicit in the desire to translate. “For if a translator perceives his or her role as partly that of ‘improving’ either the SL text or existing translations, and that is indeed often the reason why we undertake translations, an implicit value judgment underlies this position.” (p. 18)

Bassnett overviews some theorists. Sapir: Languages are different realities. Lotman: Language is a modeling system. Whorf: Language and culture are interdependent. Jakobson on translation: *rewording, *translation proper, *transmutation. To Jakobson, all poetic art is technically untranslatable. Nida describes a process diagram of decoding and recoding: 1) Source language text; 2) Analysis [parse, decoding]; 3) Transfer [meaning that lies inbetween, nonverbal]; 4) Restructuring [encoding, choice happens here]; 5) Receptor language translation. (p. 23)

Ludskanov: Semiotic translation is a matter of process and operations. Sassure: there are syntagmatic and associative relationships (horizontal and vertical): The signified value that represents a cultural object may be equivalent across cultures, but the role and significance of the object may not. Terms may denote the same physical objects, but the relevance and connotation of said objects may vary over cultures. (p. 26) In this vein, there are types of equivalence of meanings. Popovic has 4 types. 1) Linguistic equivalence; 2) Paradigmatic equivalence; 3) Stylistic equivalence; 4) Textual/Syntagmatic equivalence. Nida defines two types of equivalence, formal and dynamic. Dynamic equivalence aims for an equivalence of effect (***). Popovic understands there as being an invariant core between translations and a source text. This aspect is especially relevant for adaptation. (p. 33)

Translatability is deeply connected to human experience. Mounin claims that 1) Unique personal experience is untranslatable; 2) The base units of two languages are not always comparable; 3) Communication is possible when account is taken of the respective situations of the speaker and hearer / author and translator. So, communication is possible, but what is that? J. Levy: The translation process to attain the most effect (most equivalence of meaning) with the minimum of effort (or distortion or awkwardness) implies a minmax strategy. (p. 42)

Historically, translation begins to pick up prominence with the Romans, who were interested in incorporating culture from Greece and other conquered areas. Greek was the cultured language, and educated Romans knew the language. Thus, translations of Greek texts were expected to be read in context of the original sources. Translation became a matter of style as opposed to enabling comprehension. This is very similar to matters of adaptation, since adapted works are often viewed in context of each other. It also enables an extra subversive dimension to translation, to highlight or emphasize certain aspects of the original text. (p. 50)

With medieval translation, aspects of value began to emerge. Translations were horizontal if both the SL and TL had a similar value, these moved texts within “equivalent” cultural systems. Other translations could ve considered vertical: ones which brought elevated material (such as Latin texts) into a vulgar or common audience. These approaches brought to translation the dilemmas of loss and accessibility as studied by Bacon and Dante. (p. 57)

In the 1800s, translation and texts became an issue of property and ownership. The original was considered to have significantly more worth than the translation. The value of the translation was in the ability for the original to be marketed to a larger audience. This mirrors very closely the use of intellectual property in modern times. The approaches to translation developed here (at extremes are Longfellow, who is interested in content rather than style, versus Edward Fitzgerald, who is interested in liveliness) can be seen in adaptations of game IP. Both of these views carry elitism, one in which the source is infinitely superior to the translation, and the other in which the translations are haute exotic specimens of original texts. Some bullet points on colonial translation: 1) The SL text is de facto pre-eminent over any TL version; 2) Translation is a means of encouraging readers to return to the SL original; 3) Translation is a means of helping the reader become a better reader of the original; 4) Translation is a means for the translator to offer his own pragmatic choices to TL readers; 5) Translation is a means for upgrading SL texts because it is at a lower cultural level. (p. 74)

In approaching translation as a process, one must examine how texts are read. Reading a text necessitates taking a position on it, and the translator is necessarily a reader, so some position taking is necessary. There are several means of doing such: 1) The reader focuses on the content as matter, picking out the prose argument or the poetic paraphrase; 2) The reader grasps the complexity of the work and the way that the levels interact; 3) The reader deliberately extrapolates one level of a work for a specific purpose; 4) The reader discovers elements not basic to the genesis of the text and uses the text for his own purposes. (p. 80)

On period translation. Necessarily, human experience may extrapolate, but…. “The greatest problem when translating a text from a period remote in time is not only that the poet and his contemporaries are dead, but the significance of the poem in its context is dead too. Sometimes, as with the pastoral, for example, the genre is dead and no amount of fidelity to the original form, shape or tone will help the rebirth of a new line of communication, to use Maria Corti’s terms, unless the TL system is taken into account equally. With the classics, this first means overcoming the problem of translating along a vertical axis, where the SL text is seen as being of a higher status than the TL text.” (p. 85-86)

Translation may be used as a device to scaffold new moral/value/cultural systems onto an existing source text. This may be especially interesting when a source text is known and the product is viewed in this context. Such translations may be fairly subversive or revelatory about the nature of such texts. (p. 110) In translating prose, Bassnett emphasizes an importance on looking at prose as being part of a larger system of text, whereas naiive translators may attempt to plod along linearly. To combat this, Bassnett urges us to think of portions of prose as units. This sounds very reminiscent of unit operations. These originate from Hillaire Belloc, who describes units as means of blocking out translations. (p. 117)

Bassnett concludes with leaving a great deal of material uncovered, since the field is so great. One of the closing discussions concerns dramatic translations, which are especially interesting due to their cultural, physical, and spectacular nature. Bassnett suggests that it is assumable that there exists a structure of performability that is physical and independent of language. (p. 123)

This bridges the worlds of narratology and cognitive science (especially mental models) with crystal clarity. Narrative defines a world, and readers understand a story by understanding the underlying model. “This amounts to claiming, rather unspectacularly, that people try to understand a narrative by figuring out what particular interpretation of characters, circumstances, actions, and events informs the design of the story.” (p. 1) This is foundational! Herman’s investigation ties narratology to linguistics and cognitive science, but to him, it is cognitive science that underpins the study.

Existing narrative theory goes from structuralist movements (Todorov, Genette, Barthes, Prince) to more recent narratologists, who focus on generation and emergence (Ryan, Fludernik, Jahn). Here, the target of narrative analysis is the storyworld, which is similar to the concept of the discourse model in linguistics. The focus of these is to explore beyond what is stated in the text, but to extrapolate the knowledge that is implicit or inferred in the discourse or story.

The first part of the book discusses narrative microdesigns, while the latter half is on macrodesigns. Microdesigns are the features defining states, events, and characters, whereas the macrodesigns plot the mood or feel of the model in a broader sense. The features of macrodesigns are issues such as spatiality or temporality, especially with respect to how these map out onto how the story is read and understood.

Herman invokes the critique of story grammars from Wilensky and Johnson-Laird. However, the critique of story grammars requires more care than it is usually given. The real challenge comes from the complexity of language, which is rife with ambiguity and textual cues. “Thus the real task for narrative analysts–a task only begun in the present study–is to chart constraints on the variable patterning of textual cues with the mental representations that make up storyworlds.” (p. 12) A story cannot be fully specified by a structural grammar, because of the importance of cues. Understanding (and adaptation) come from deciphering those cues and using them to reconstruct the storyworld.

The storyworld captures the ecology of narrative interpretation. It is important to capture the environment of a story, not just the events themselves. This shift is further justified by research in narrative understanding.

Herman notes the role of adaptation within story worlds: “Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea (1993), for example, does not falsify Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre (1960) but rather supplements it; in this process, Lubomir Dolezel (1998: 199-226) has called ‘literary transduction,’ one fictional world extends the scope of another by sketching a ‘successor world’ that may precede the ‘protoworld’ in time, feature a different constellation of participants, and fill in otherwise irrecoverable gaps in the protoworld.” (p. 16) This treatment explores a storyworld as something open and shared, that may be extended and interpreted. The idea that a world may be extended highlights the plasticity of storyworlds. Other philosophers (Deleuze for example) might claim that disparate storyworlds may be woven together and connected to form broader conceptions of meaning.

Discourse models depend on Emmott’s contextual frames. These operate like Goffman’s frames for interaction. A guiding theme here is whether a storyworld is special in relation to other kinds of models.

States, Events, and Actions

Herman’s focus of story here is on states, events, and actions. Namely, the aspect of storyness that depends on statefulness and transitions. There is a reference here to Mark Turner, on the narrative basis for understanding the world. Turner argues for a kind of conceptual blending (called a “parabolic projection”) wherein one story is projected onto another to help make it more tractable. The theme guiding this chapter is understanding the relationship between the way that states change in stories, and how these are interpreted. One rule used in interpretation is “understand events as actions,” but this proves to be problematic as it does not address the complexity and gray area between events and actions.

The study here is primarily on microdesign, that is, the extra information that word choice and construction play in the meaning of sentences. But, Herman extends the conclusions more broadly. There are a number of things that exist between states and actions, for instance, activities and achievements. Sentences may be constructed to favor one over another, but over the course of a story, this forms a chain of choices, which informs the reading of the story on the whole. Genres have different preferential typologies for how events are presented.

• Epic : Accomplishments > achievements > activities > states
• News reports : Achievements > accomplishments > activities > states
• Psychological novels : States > activities > accomplishments > achievements
• Ghost stories : Activities > states > accomplishments > achievements

This analysis is important because it exposes the way that certain types of genres are fundamentally different. It bears a comparison to the construction of different types of games: a sim game has a different event typology than an action game, for example. It is also remarkable because it skewers Aristotle’s poetics. The hierarchy used by one genre is that genre’s own, and this must be cast as a difference in genre, rather than an issue of superiority or inferiority.

Herman gives an analysis of Kafka’s The Metamorphosis. There is a relation of narrative traditions, but also important is how certain genre encoding strategies construct and define the tacit logic of the storyworld. The analysis of The Metamorphosis illustrates how it uses genre conventions (of realist fiction) to communicate its message. This logic or model depends on its representation. As an extrapolation: A News report reading of the Odyssey would not have the same model. In order for an adaptation to work, it must be able to preserve the entire model, that includes the model from the genre.

Action Representations

This section is on further distinguishing the gray area between events and actions. Actions are generally attributed as depending on intention and agency. However, the nature of intention in an event is not always clear. Eventness and actionness is also dependent on the observer’s perspective. The narration in a story can make an occurrence seem more like an event or more like an action depending on the representation. For example, in Pride and Prejudice: Darcy and Bingley’s arrival at Netherfield is an event from the perspective of the Bennett family, but is certainly an action on the part of the characters themselves.

In an effort to further explain actions, Herman explores some parameters and categories of actions. The following types are borrowed from Von Wright (1983). These types relate to the intentional and effectual qualities of actions. (p.61):

1. Producing a given state of affairs
2. Leaving the state to continue absent
3. sustaining the state
4. letting the state cease to obtain
5. destroying the state
6. leaving the state to continue present
7. suppressing the state
8. letting the state come to obtain

Another system of parameters is borrowed from Rescher (1966; p. 215), and described on the next page (p. 62):

1. Agent (who did it)
2. Act-type (what did he do)
3. Modality of action (how did he or she do it?)
   a. Modality of manner (in what manner did he or she do it?)
   b. Modality of means (by what means did he or she do it?)
4. Setting of the action (in what context did he or she do it?)
   a. Temporal aspect (when did he or she do it?)
   b. Spatial aspect (where did he or she do it?)
   c. Circumstantial aspect (under what circumstances did he or she do it?)
5. Rationale of action (why did he or she do it?)
   a. Causality (what caused him or her to do it?)
   b. Finality (with what aim did he or she do it?)
   c. Intentionality (in what state of mind did he or she do it?)

This categorization and parameterization is useful as an analytic tool for reading actions in narratives, and also as a constructive tool for planning how actions should be composed and executed.

Scripts, Sequences, and Stories

Herman is attempting to discern here the difference between narrative and non-narrative forms. The difference seems to be in knowledge structures: schemata, scripts, and frames. These emerge from cognitive science, AI, and (I would argue) sociology. Storyness relates to expectations. Ultimately, this must be grounded in an experiential repertoire. Part of a story will trigger something that is activated, which will enable the rest of the story to make sense.

On one hand, this could be considered an instance of classical dramatic structure, but it also makes sense being more broadly understood as an artifact of cognition. The mind functions associatively, and constructs models. Together, these facts suggest that observed information (discourse or story elements) are actively assembled and make meaning when they form a model that is consistent with subsequent information.

Herman is arguing for a more narrow conception of narrative, though. Recipes or syllogisms are not exactly stories, but they do operate as models that make sense when assembled. He realizes this fuzzyness, and argues for a scalar range of narratives. The quality of narrativity depends primarily on a work’s recognition as narrative, but some works (for example Joyce’s Finnegans Wake) cannot be interpreted or recognized easily. This I would argue returns to the experiential basis of recognition. I would say that the capacity to identify a work as narrative is secondary to the capacity to recognize and understand the work in the first place.

Herman ties together elements of storyness, recognition, and originality. Stories are understood by familiarity with models and concepts. There is a conflict between the value of the form versus the content of a story. Herman argues that people use a number of processing strategies to make meaning from a story. These strategies are not elaborated, but I would guess that these strategies could be argued to make significant use of conceptual blending (of form, content, with prior experience and familiarity with other works).

Participant Roles and Relations

This section is on the relation between storyworld and participants. Herman generalizes participants from characters, because the term “participant” broadens the study, and focuses on involvementt and actions. The idea of participants (or actants) is borrowed from Greimas. Herman’s concern in this chapter is to differentiate between the participant/actant and circumstances. My intention here is to compare storyworld participants with the idea of the player. In the light that a storry is a representation of a storyworld populated by participants, the narrative to game comparison seems less stark and surprisingly natural.

There is a concern here over what sorts of roles and positions participants have. An example here is the distinction between processes and roles. Another genre typology compares some preferences: (p. 147)

1. Epic : Actor > Behaver > Sayer > Experiencer
2. Allegory : Identified > Actor > Sayer > Experiencer
3. 19th century realistic novel : Actor > Carrier > Sayer > Behaver
4. Psychological novel : Experiencer > Behaver > Carrier > Sayer
5. Detective novel : Experiencer > Actor
6. Ghost story : Experiencer > Sayer

In a game adaptation of a narrative, the player must be a participant, and be put into these roles, as appropriate for the particular genre or story.

This is liable to be a multi-part post, because it seems like there is a lot of ground to cover. I have a lot to say about The Sims. It bears noting first that the game I am most familiar with is not the original, but rather its sequel The Sims 2, which is also broadened by a variety of expansion packs. Generally, when I talk about The Sims, I am thinking of the whole franchise. As a game it is extremely notable, but also relevant to my research because of several factors:

1. It is a people simulator. Its subject matter is mundane and domestic, about people going about their lives in a day to day manner.
2. The AI that controls the Sims is ferociously dumb. The Sims act according to a hill climbing algorithm in relation to the world around them. The technical implementation of this is called “smart terrain” and all the logic is encoded within the objects with which the Sims interact.
3. The game is exceptionally evocative. The setting and characters are believable in a way that makes them engaging and fun to play with.
4. It broke the gender barrier: More than half the players of the Sims are female. This is especially true of the machinima community. (A citation would be helpful here)
5. The Sims has a powerful modular architecture that enables it to be modded easily, and is supplementable through expansion packs.
6. The Sims is the best selling PC game of all time.

All of these factors make the game extremely significant in the landscape of PC games everywhere, especially given the immense popularity and uniqueness of The Sims franchise. I want to explain here why it is so relevant to the work I am doing now.

The first and foremost reason why The Sims is relevant is because of the AI. The Sims themselves are believable, but not realistic. Characters have a state that is built around specific domain models (relationships, needs, “skills”, etc) rather than propositional models. What is fascinating about this is the sheer lack of material that could have been encoded into the model, what is more, the game works better because of this absence. Consider some of the things normally important to AI that have been left out. Beliefs and world knowledge is one example. Sims are totally autonomous. They can behave fine in one space just as well as another. Instead, all of the real intelligence is representational. The Sims are not believable because of an accurate or realistic model, but rather because of an evocative representational model.

There is an intricate balance in the game between simulation and representation. But, before it is possible to explore that in more detail, it is necessary to examine what is actually being simulated. The Sims is a people simulator. It represents domestic life, but as is the case with all Maxis games, it is a specific flavor of domestic life. The original game of the Sims presented a model of a materialistic suburban life. However, this model has been expanded in subsequent expansion packs. These expansions expand the complexity of the underlying model by introducing new logical elements. The Sims 2: Seasons is about how weather affects people’s moods and lives. The Sims 2: Free Time explores the social and personal dimensions of interests and hobbies. It will require a careful analysis to examine exactly what is being modeled, but some insight can be gained by looking into how the modeling works.

The original game of The Sims was heavily influenced by the logic of Maslow’s heirarchy of needs. The implementation in The Sims places each element: needs, relationships, skills in terms of sliding numeric values. This approach of representing things numerically can be considered The Sims modeling strategy. This approach is effective but also leaves out a great amount of detail. The strategy can convey simple relationships (between entities and concepts) in a domain. Notably, this representation strategy cannot represent complex relationships where there is a formal structure between entities. An example of this sort of complexity is in human relationships when there is internal complexity and occasional self contradictions. Another example of this flaw can be seen in the single/dual axis representations of morality in games (Fable, D&D).

The work that I am doing uses a very different modeling strategy. My strategy is much more symbolically oriented and structural, because my goal is to represent the sorts of relationships that are impossible with numerical sliders. Specifically, human behavior and relationships are modeled using Goffman’s framework revolving around roles and performance, which are fuzzy and complex. The real issue at steak is how to increase logical complexity without undermining representational power.

Overview:

This collection was released in 1983, the same year as Jonson-Laird’s publishing of a book with the same name. While Johnson-Laird is concerned with developing a linguistic theory of mental models grounded in computational theory, Gentner and Stevens present a collection of papers on how mental models are used in numerous applications. There is a strong theme of using models in science, especially science education and expert reasoning.

My concern with mental models is twofold: I want to understand how to model characters within simulation, and I also want to understand how users will form models after interacting with a simulation. I am not as concerned with the instruction and dissemination of a specific model, but rather, I want to find ways of provoking introspection and criticism of models.

In these essays, individuals have and use models, often conflicting models. With so many conflicting models it seems almost a wonder that people can think at all. Model use is often ingrained and automatic, but only when the model appears to be inconsistent with the subject to which the model is applied, does the model become suddenly a conscious jumble of ideas and rules. My reading of Gentner and Stevens is going to primarily be oriented towards examining these areas of model formation, use, and critique.

Notes:

Mental models, as argued here, are how we understand the world. Research on them is about furthering and deepening self understanding. Applied use of mental models is pedagogical, teaching better models, and teaching models better, for applied use. Mental models research tends to have three dimensions. These are good guidelines for considering models of fictional domains.

1. Domains. In mental models research, the problem domains should be something tractable, where it is possible to discern an expert from a novice. Thus, a domain such as fluid dynamics is more tractable than interpersonal dynamics. It is easier to distinguish an expert in a scientific domain than a humanistic one.
2. Theoretical Approach. The research should have a formal representation of the models to be used. Representations are usually made with computational semantics. I would argue that not all domains will have the same representations, but some formalization is necessary.
3. Methodology. The methodologies used are highly varied and eclectic. This can be anything from protocol analysis, to psychological experiments, to simulation and comparison with experts.

This is priceless: “From what we have said so far, it is clear that the ideal mental-models researcher would be a combination of cognitive psychologist, artificial intelligence researcher, anthropologist, linguist, and philosopher, and certainly a knowledgable practitioner of the domain being studied.” The suite of skills is very reminiscent of the artist/programmer and theorist/practitioner interdisciplinary hybrids.

Donald Norman: Some Observations on Mental Models

Norman’s paper is to essentially extend the introduction and explain a little bit more about what mental models are and what sort of properties they have. Norman explains that his goal is to partly belabour the obvious. He gives a few useful bullet points about how he sees mental models (p. 8):

1. Mental models are incomplete.
2. People’s abilities to “run” their models are severely limited.
3. Mental models are unstable: People forget the details of the system they are using, especially when those details (or the whole system) have not been used for some period.
4. Mental models do not have firm boundaries: similar devices and operations get confused with one another.
5. Mental models are “unscientific”: people maintain “superstitious” behavior patterns even when they know they are unneeded because they cost little in physical effort and save mental effort.
6. Mental models are parsimonious: Often people do extra physical operations rather than the mental planning that would allow them to avoid those actions; they are willing to trade-off extra physical action for reduced mental complexity. This is especially ture where the extra actions allow one simplified rule to apply to a variety of devices, thus minimizing the chances for confusion.

Norman also explains some formalizations of models. A system is t, the conceptualization is C, and the model M. The conceptualization, as defined, is the scientific or expert model of the system. Four elements may be observed: t, the system itself. C(t), the expert model of the system. M(t), the user’s model of the system. Finally, C(M(t)) is the researcher’s understanding of the user’s mental model. There are three issues related to understanding models: beliefs, observability, and predictive power.

The formulation of conceptual models is as tools for teaching a system. This phrasing privleges it to other kinds of models. It suggests thtat ideally, M(t) = C(t). This is the notion of classic authorship, privleging the author’s interpretation, precisely the sort of thing that Barthes rebelled against. The idea is necessarily that the expert’s understanding is the ideal way, and that a user’s model is wrong if it does not line up. This makes sense when the subject matter is something like a Nuclear reactor, where it is important for users have a strong and correct model that reflects the system itself, but it is less explicable when dealing with everyday artifacts that may be used toward a variety of ends, as opposed to original stated goals.

Jill Larkin: The Role of Problem Representation in Physics

The problem here is the relationship between ordinary human prediction with formal physics. A naive representation or model uses objects in the real world, but an expert will construct a special model in addition, that replaces objects with physical objects (that have special properties), and also includes fictitious entities, such as forces and moments.

Physicists use several schemas for producing physical representations. The schemas are the “forces schema” and the “work-energy schema.” Both of these have internally consistent sets of rules and operations. They are consistent with each other, but require very different understandings of the underlying problems. Representations have rules for construction and extension, and these are very different between the two schemas.

Larkin examines how several users of varying proficiency apply these schemas in problem solving, from easy problems, to hard, and then very hard problems. Harder problems require the solver to make use of multiple schemas and translate between them. In the very hard problem, the subjects will form a model with a schema, attempt to work with it, and then discard it if it is inconsistent. The very hard problem can be solved using one of the schemas, but the translation from the given information in the problem cannot be filled in directly. Expert subjects quickly select a schema and then spend time constructing the model itself.

Novice problem solvers, specifically students, quickly match problems to quantitative models, without constructing a physical representation. This seems to be done via pattern matching, identifying elements in the problem that fit into to learned formulas.

Williams, Hollan, Stevens: Human Reasoning About a Simple Physical System

The goal here is to understand reasoning with mental models. A model is a tool used in reasoning. Understanding a model and how it is used informs understanding of human mistakes and reasoning. The authors give an extremely useful formalization of models. A model is runnable, with autonomous objects with some internal topology. An autonomous object has an explicit state, relations, parameters, and rules. The model is a collection of autonomous objects. (p. 133-134)

The concept of an autonomous object is extremely important to the author’s formalization of models here. It further strongly resembles the way to construct a system for simulation. If objects are autonomous, the model can simply be run by gathering the objects together and applying the rules of the system over time. According to the description given, autonomous objects are generally opaque, but may themselves be deconstructed into models themselves. Generally, they will only have 3 to 4 ports with which to interact with other objects.

The rest of the chapter explores the applications of this theory of mental models to subjects understanding of a heat exchanger. The exchanger is the simple physical system, and the authors examine the models that subjects form while trying to answer questions about the system. There are about three models used, which are inconsistent with each other and thus exclusive. The way subjects form the models is analyzed according to inference diagrams. Models are shifted rapidly, and subjects uses multiple models to answer questions. New models are only created when some form of inconsistency occurs.

Each of the models also appear to be grounded in some sort of metaphorical analogy. For example, the pipes in the exchanger are containers: they contain heat. Thus, the subject reasons about the pipes as they would reason about containers.

Michael McCloskey: Naive Theories of Motion

This section is concerned with understanding students naive theories of motion. Many students make very similar mistakes regarding the motion of objects. What is startling is that the naive theoriy of motion is internally conistent, and shared very consistently among the observed subjects. That means that most incorrect responses are of the same inherent type, and stem from a single misconception about objects.

The naive theory of physics is essentially “impetus” theory, which has roots in pre-Newtonian science. The idea with impetus theory is an object that is moving has some internal force that keeps it going. Without extra effort spent pushing the object, the impetus will eventually subside and the object will stop. This is fascinating because it relates back to emobodiment and self-analogy: Young learners will understand objects as they understand themselves: “I have to expend effort to keep moving, so other objects moving must do that as well.” This model is pervasive, and even knowledgable subjects who understand the principles of energy and momentum will explain those concepts in terms of impetus.

There is a brief discussion on education. We should think here about exploring more complex models (that do not have a necessarily correct solution to every problem). What is revealing is that for dispersal of impetus theory, it is not enough to simulate the real models, but rather deconstruct the faulty ones. This is important in situations where models are ambiguous or complicated. There is an emphasis here on exposure. It is of utmost importance to expose the internal workings of flawed or faulty models.

Overview:

Tomasello’s problem is to understand how humans developed so rapidly in the evolutionary scheme. He suggests that a small genetic change enabled a process of cultural formation. Early primates can use tools, but they must learn individually. Humans have the power to build on top of existing knowledge. The underlying change that Tomasello argues consists primarily of intentionality, but also the qualities of imitation and identification.

Notes:

A Puzzle and a Hypothesis

Tomasello is looking at the anthropological origin of human cognition. He is concerned with how cognition and complex behavior came so quickly the larger evolutionary scheme. He notes 3 categories of human development: Tools, Language (symbols), and Rituals.

“One reasonable hypothesis, then, is that the amazing suite of cognitive skills and products displayed by modern humans is the result of some sort of species-unique mode or modes of cultural transmission.” (p. 4)

The hypothesis provided is that humans have a species unique method of transmission of skills, rather than a biological one. The key element to this is a process that he calls the ratchet effect. Most animals use biologically inherited skills. Primates develop learned skills, but these are individually learned. Humans have the capacity to build skills over the course of development, where skills gained in one generation continue to the next.

Tomasello is looking at development, similarly to Vygotsky. Learning is dependent on others, and culturally mediated. To Tomasello, the key i all of this is identification. “These special powers come directly from the fact that as one human being is learning ‘through’ another, she identifies with that other person and his intentional and sometimes mental states.”

He argues for the uniqueness of human cognition because of traits at three levels. These traits are genetically based, but culturally implemented.

• Phylogenetically (before birth), humans have the ability to identify with others.
• Historiacally, development of artifacts and knowledge accumulates over time, and is does not start from scratch in each generation.
• Ontogenetically (after birth), children develop in atmosphere of skills and signs, internalizing existing symbols and knowledge.

Biological and Cultural Learning

There is development in some animal species that is based on social interaction. This is called cultural transmission, and develops cultural traditions. This is a broad sense of tradition, though. The human difference in cultural transmission is in identification.

One of the differences between primate and other animal cognition is in the ability to recognize intentions. “Nonhuman primates are themselves intentional and causal beings, they just do not understand the world in intentional and causal terms.” (p. 19)

Later, intentionality is something that is attributable or projected onto other beings or individuals. Nonhuman primates fail in identifying causality: The example given on p. 22 shows a primates having a great deal of trouble with the trapped tube.

If we relate the understanding of intentionality as deriving from identification, we can see the influence of Vygotsky here. The essence of this is that “others intend because I intend.” This takes place throughout development, and varies with the developmental capability of the child. The gist is that when the child can have intentions, it can recognize intentions in others. This idea relates very closely to Lacan’s mirror stage, which occurs at around 6 months, where the infant begins to recognize itself. Initially, the infant is in opposition and at rivalry with its own image, but then comes to identify with it. This notion can be extended to identification with others.

Cases of nonhuman primate learning and culture: Tomasello attempts to debunk and critique the projection of social learning onto nonhuman primates. Characteristics of nonhuman primate learning:

• Individual learning (not social)
• Emulation learning (not imitative)
• Ontogenetic ritualization (which is repeated responsive behaviors, not imitation)
• No active teaching
• Situational adaptation (not cultural development)

Human cultural development is intrinsically cumulative. Artifacts, which may be tools, rituals, or symbols, are developed between individuals, instead of within individuals. Thus, artifacts are gradually modified by each generation. This is the cultural ratchet. Imitation is necessary to pick up the existing base of a skill or artifact, and once that is imitated, then further development may occur. The process of ratcheting enables a history.

Another kind of ratcheting occurs between individuals through social interaction, and this is called sociogenesis. Tomasello looks explicitly at the subjects of language and mathematics.

Regarding language, Tomsaello argues that language is a gradual development: “The crucial point for current purposes is that all of the symbols and constructions of a given language are not invented at once, and once invented they often do not stay the same for very long.” (p. 42)

The idea suggested with this is that sociogenesis enables the construction of more and more complex ideas (citing the complex structure and function of languages). But, within communities, the essence of practice is to make complex ideas into simple ones. This can pull back to Lakoff’s notion of metaphor. To a developing individual, learning is about understanding complexities in embodied or familiar terms.

Regarding mathematics, in early civilization there were a large diversity of numeric representations. Eventually, Arabic numerals spread and became widely adopted. This suggests that the cultural ratchet operates on a very broad scale (across continents, even). The spread and adoption of ideas is also addressed by mimetics, where the idea is imitated and spreads. From the mimetic perspective, ideas that are good at being imitated (and utility positively affects this), will spread more readily. This idea is consistent with Tomasello’s emphasis on imitation, and emphasizes the notion that utility of ideas is not universal.

Tomasello makes a further distinction. Instead of the dichotomy of learned vs. innate, the dichotomy of ontogeny vs. phylogeny is more useful, and we should focus on ontogeny. What does that mean? What is the difference between it and phylogeny and learned behavior? In his description, ontogeny (at least in humans) has a special emphasis on imitation and intentionality. Ontogeny extends beyond learned behavior in that it is more than merely environmental adaptation or response. Ontogeny has to do with how behaviors emerge: “… the goal is not to decide whether some structure is or is not ‘innate,’ but rather to determine the process involved in its development.” (p. 51)

Joint Attention and Cultural Learning

There are 3 elements to early infant cognition: Understanding objects: Infants understand some principles behind how objects work, even before their capacity to manipulate them.

Understanding other persons: The have “built-in” facial recognition, and a capacity to imitate facial expressions. This is potentially a root of identification. Understanding self: They understand the limits of the self in manipulation, and will bail out of unachievable tasks. This is the stuff that appears during early development, and is similar to other primates.

At 9 months, a tremendous cognitive change begins to take place. This is manifested as a collection of behaviors that Tomasello calls joint attention. “But at around nine to twelve months of age a new set of behaviors begins to emerge that are not dyadic, like these early behaviors, but are triadic in the sense that they involve a coordination of their interactions with objects and people, resulting in a referential triangle of child, adult, and the object or event to which they share attention.” (p. 62)

Tomasello gives 3 accounts for the 9 month revolution, each of which is flawed in its own way.

1. No strong cognitive changes take place as ability to interact is innate, and they possess some primary intersubjectivity, but infants lack motor capacity to express these interactions (Trevarthen 1979, 1993). This is countered by failure to reproduce results, and studies that reveal sophisticated motor skills.
2. Infants are preprogrammed with capacity to interact socially, but this does not activate until the appropriate time (Baron-Cohen, 1995). The different social skills are separate and become activated one at a time. The data is inconsistent with this conclusion, though.
3. The behavior around the 9-month phase is learned, and activated according to critical stimuli (Moore, 1996; Barresi and Moore, 1996). Again, observed data does not support this conclusion.

A suitable answer to this problem requires answers to the questions: Why do joint attention skills emerge together? Why does this happen at nine months?

The argument that Tomasello makes is that infants have an intrinsic ability to identify with others, and when the infant develops intentionality, then others may be understood as intentional agents as well. This is a projection of the self onto the other. The key element in this explanation is simulation. Infants may understand the other as like the self, simulating the other’s intentions in order to predict them. “Since other persons are ‘like me,’ any new understanding of my own functioning leads immediately to a new understanding of their functioning; I more or less simulate other persons’ psychological functioning by analogy to my own, which is most directly and intimately known to me.” (p. 71)

This example interrelates to the self centricity and absorbtion of toddlers. They use may their selves as a basis of understanding others, but cannot identify themselves as being beholden to the social conventions that others are subject to. This is somewhat at odds with Tomasello’s model.

The capacity to simulate is something that has been expressed by other cognitive scientists as important elements to cognition, but its development is not usually explained. For instance: Keith Oatley on interpretation of fiction.

The 9 month revolution occurs because at that point, the child becomes intentional (supported by Piaget), and it is able to identify that others are intentional as well.

Simulation is not an explicit conscious process, but rather an innate, embodied one. “My hypothesis is simply that children make the categorical judgment that others are ‘like me’ and so they should work like me as well.” (p. 75-76) Others are understood in an analogical relationship to the self. Intentional simulation is closely related to the construction of causal models, as relates to observations of physical phenomena. The intentional simulation hypothesis is supported by confirmed predictions with autistic children.

Behavior after 9 months has mimicry of intentional behavior, and further incorporation of intention to general engagement. “That is, whereas in early infancy there was some face-to-face dyadic mimicking of behavior, at nine months the infant begins to reproduce the adult’s intentional actions on outside objects.” (p. 81)

An interesting conflict occurs with playful behavior, which is construed as oppositional to intentional behavior. In play, intentional affordances are decoupled from the artifact. This is in conflict with Vygotsky, who suggest that playful artifacts are projections of unachievable desires. It seems that play would be a further example of projection and analogy, rather than decopuling.

Linguistic Communication and Symbolic Representation

Where did language come from? Symbolic representation is important because it is 1) intersubjective, and 2) perspectival. Language emerges from 1) joint attentional scenes, 2) communicative interaction, and 3) role-reversal imitation.

Language learning, and especially learning of the meaning of words comes from an identification of intentions within a joint attentional scene. “To acquire the conventional use of a linguistic symbol, the child must be able to determine the adult’s communicative intentions (the adult’s intentions toward her attention), and then engage in a process of role-reversal imitation in which she uses the new symbol toward the adult in the same way and for the same communicative purpose that the adult used it toward her.” (p. 117)

Joint attention is internalized into symbolic representation. This looks like the beginning of the internalization of social models or cultural identities. Objects are used as symbols, and this idea relates to the sense of pivoting. (p. 126)

Linguistic Constructions and Event Cognition

Children abstract from the concrete. They hear only concrete utterances, but are able to abstract them and understand linguistic structures from these. Tomasello explains that this process is very important for understanding how events are conceptualized. This idea goes back to models. Given concrete phenomena, children will develop models (intentional and causal) of how these phenomena work. There are inherent abstracting principles in model formation. The discussion here focuses on linguistic structures, suggesting that model formation depends on language.

Verbs are understood as embodied (kinematic and kinaesthetic) intentional experiences. Nouns are substitutable. This follows from joint attention: activity is intentional, but objects are targets for attention and may be interchanged. Here this level of structure is expressed in language.

Abstraction and schematization are the processes by which children form structures and categories in language. Concepts are formed and generalized (and overgeneralized) and later focused and refined. This relates back to Lakoff and Johnson. Concepts, models, linguistic constructions are developed, expanded, and used to match observed information. More interestingly, Tomassello hints (but does not address thoroughly) the idea of model divergence and refinement. This connects to conceptual blending, which explores the construction of new concepts from old ones.

Language is a tool for interpretation and conceptualization, that is, for forming and developing models. This supports the linguistic model of thought, and with intentionality, counters propositional models. However, Tomasello did hint earlier that models do occur before language. This suggests that humans have an inherent power for using models, but it is though language that these models can be most readily changed and manipulated.

Discourse and Representational Redescription

“The current hypothesis is that the perspectival nature of linguistic symbols, and the use of linguistic symbols in discourse interactions in which different perspectives are explicitly contrasted and shared, provide the raw material out of which the children of all cultures construct the flexible and multi-perspecitval–perhaps even dialogical–cognitive representations that give human cogniition much of its awesome and unique power.” (p. 163)

The interesting element here is the multi-perspectival nature of using language. This echoes back to the issue of identification. Dialogical cognitive representations seems related to the idea of simulation. Tomasello is saying here that cognition is powerful because of multi-perspectival ability.

The function of discourse: negotiating the form of an utterance from its content. This adopts a symbolic view, but one that is not propositional. Tomasello argues for a model based view of communication. The feedback in discourse enables feedback on model construction. Reconciling differences relates to synthesizing and blending models. (p. 171)

There is a question posed here: Intentional agency versus mental/belief/moral agency. He contrasts between theory-theory and simulation theory. Both are rationalizations for how children understand others as having varying beliefs. Tomasello explains the understanding of varying beliefs as a natural and gradual consequence of development. (p. 174)

Overview

The authors are interested in looking at identity as a process rather than a product. The study descends from Vygotsky and Bakhtin, both of whom belong to a particular school of Russian Cultural Theory. What is unusual about this perspective, as compared to a great deal of cultural theory, is that it presents a very complex perspective on the development of identity, and frames identity as something that is both culturally affected, but something that individuals have agency over.

Notes

The Woman Who Climbed up the House

Identity is partially a cultural product, and relates to self-interpretation. This idea of acting to become an identity strongly resembles Goffman: The self is elusive, but ultimately is a performance, even internally. Mead (who was a significant influence on Goffman) is referenced, and remains a strong influence on the discussion throughout the book. Identity is something that is proactive, put forward as an active force within an individual’s behavior and actions.

“It is not that we have an inclination to the idea of a unified subject; we conceive persons as composites of many, often contradictory, self-understandings and identities, whose loci are often not confined to the body but ‘spread over the material and social environment,’ and few of which are completely durable.” (p. 8) The study is spread over different cultural worlds, which enable different modes of understanding. These are worlds of meaning and conflicting value systems.

Holland recollects an example that occurred during field work in Nepal. The culture system in Nepal involves a strict caste system, where lower classes cannot transgress onto the upper classes in a number of ways. Specifically, it is culturally offensive for a lower class person to go into the kitchen of a higher class person. The incident occurred when Holland was going to interview a woman belonging to one of the lower classes, who would need to pass through the kitchen of the household (which belonged to an upper class family), in order to reach the balcony where the interview would take place. The woman instead chose to climb up the side of the house to reach the balcony.

Climbing the house can be thought of as a certain kind of conceptual blend. It is an emergent property of cultural conditions and this particular frame of interaction, the interview. There are two perspectives to this situation. The first is the theme of cultural logic, which uses a theme of embodiment, where individuals are compelled via forces operating according to history. A second possibility is subject position theory, which looks at subjects as being forced into explict positions, and this is supported by a constructivist approach (Irvine). Another possibility is that agents are forward planning and perform some sort of explicit planning and optimization strategy, but this lacks much of the subtlety and depth that is put forth by the other theories.

The culturalist theory: Humans are products of culture and cultural forces. Constructivisim: Individual negotiation of subject positions. Resolution: Use both perspectives, but focus on the emergent phenomena themselves. Focus on improvisation and spontaneous behavior because of or in spite of cultural context.

A Practice Theory of Self and Identity

A great deal of challenge to conventional theories of identity (individual/relational, as relates to the interaction of self and culture) comes from Foucault. The above theories of identity require an unproblematic relationship between the individual and culture. Foucault is highly critical of ordinary subjectification, which would enable such a relationship. His criticism is used to expose the complexities of subjectification.

The authors move in the direction of using activity theory. It is used as a way to understanding identity. The perspective here does not look at the self as completely autonomous, or completely socially or culturally driven, but rather: looks at a complex dialogue between the two, and this is activity. Sources: Leontiev (Vygotsky’s student) and Bourdieu. The focus here is on what people do, and that defines identity as a matter of practice.

Figured Worlds

The human understanding of cultural worlds is figured. The idea is that all understanding of the world is imagined. Essentially: meaning only exists within certain domains of understanding. This idea rejects that understanding works at a whole or total level, but instead asserts that meaning can only exist within focused domains or systems: figured worlds. Some of this hinges on Vygotsky’s notion of play, where symbols are substituted for objects. The argument can be that substitution is an every day, adult phenomenon. Figured worlds resemble Goffman’s notion of framing.

Artifacts relate to the construction of figured worlds. They are symbolically endowed, pivots for opening the conceptual space of a world. This relates to Tomasello’s cultural ratcheting. Artifacts enable history. Also, recollect the use of artifacts in The Sims. Artifacts are keys for enabling certain kinds of activities, and certain structures of meaning. They are lenses and keys that let us view the world through the figured world that they unlock. An artifact may be more than a physical object, but can also be certain kinds of words, symbols, or ideas. (p. 61)

Personal Stories in Alcoholics Anonymous

AA is a figured world, associated with the identity of the alcoholic. Along with this identity is a large set of symbolic values and meanings particular to this world. One major artifact in the process of understanding the alcoholic’s identity is the personal story. The figured world of AA is limiting and in conflict with other worlds, specifically to the world before the individual’s introduction to AA. This section focuses on the agency of individuals via personal stories.

The alcoholic identity is defined by drinking. Acceptance of identity requires a reformulation of self-perception in AA’s terms. Instead of one’s neurosis leading to drinking, the drinking is seen to cause the neurosis. The personal story is a structured narrative for perpetuating this figured world, which redefines the world in the terms of alcohol.

How Figured Worlds of Romance Become Desire

This section is on the world of romance among college students. Formulation here is a sort of narrative (or model) defined by this figured world of romance. The active question is how the figured world leads to desire or compulsion to act in its terms. A figured world is more than just a means of interpretation, but it also an active model, which compels and encourages the individual to act in the world’s terms. Romance is seen as a sort of modeled world, where individuals are cast in terms of concepts of “attractiveness,” a sort of value or capital for this world.

The issue with romantic identity: The romantic or relationship-going identity is one that individuals may devote time to. Each identity comes bundled with a world of meanings and internal logics. What is the relationship between identity and role? Varying degrees of commitment to an identity relates to the figured world’s salience.

There is a reference to Dreyfus: The authors compare Dreyfus’s approach to the types of experience and knowledge, and the states of learning and mastery as applies to the figured world of romance. According to Dreyfus, knowledge and mastery is gained from experience and pattern matching, and thus becomes known as higher level symbols. Melford Spiro: Symbols are motivating. The authors use Dreyfus’s account of expert knowledge to be a formation of identity. “The individual comes to experience herself not as following rules or maxims taught by others but as devising her own moves. Dreyfus describes this change as obtaining a sense of responsibility in the system. Perhaps a better phrasing would be that the individual gains a sense of being in the system–understanding herself in terms of the activity.” (p. 118)

Positional Identities

Social position is important within figured worlds. It becomes incorporated into ones own identity within the world, and becomes a disposition.

The Sexual Auction Block

Figured worlds may also be used as tools to leverage power against others. Through invoking pivots, one can shift a situation to one in which they have power over another. In this point of view, values formed by different figured worlds may become forms of capital to exert influence in different figured worlds. The examples provided in this chapter focus around sexual abuses and harassment, but the principle of leveraging power extends beyond gender and sexuality.

Authoring Selves

The self is a variable, not just constructed, but actively formed. From Bakhtin, it is dialogue, from Levi-Strauss, it is a bricoleur. Referencing Mead, the self is built in relation to others.

Forming the self in relation to other worlds, one can imagine the frames defining the other figured worlds as taking on the voices of others. The self can be considered to be authored dialogically between these voices. For example: one can imagine the figured world of the good citizen taking on the voice of a parent or teacher.

Play Worlds, Liberatory Worlds, and Fantasy Resources

Play is a means for the emergence of new figured worlds. Play is also a domain of mastery. This ties together experimentation with sociological roles (think Goffman and Turkle), development of practices (Bakhtin), and internalization of discourse (Foucault). Play originates as a ground for experimentation and adaptation to roles, but can lead to indoctrination and immersion.

“Courtly Love” reflects a socially shared imagined world. Not exactly a fictional setting, but rather a fictional figured world. This is expressed as an ongoing literary tradition. In some conceptions, courtly love might be considered a genre, which as I understand, is a model in of itself, but here it is expressed as a world.

Overview:

Johnson-Laird gives an overview an account of mental models that originally is derived from Kenneth Craik. Craik’s use of models was originally directed towards an account of explanation. The review Johnson-Laird gives is to find a mechanism for formalizing meaning in language that explains cognition. The formulation is strongly tied in the notion of computation, and models are represented as computationally formalizable. This puts Johnson-Laird at odds with proponents of embodiment, but his theory nonetheless gives a formal strategy for forming and understanding mental models.

Notes:

The prologue introduces a set of questions which is good for characterizing the investigation. Here are a couple of them (p. ix):

• Why is it that we cannot think everything at once but are forced to have one thought after another? Our memories exist together, yet we cannot call them to mind all at once, but only one at a time.
• Why are there silences when we think aloud? Aren’t we thinking at those moments, or are we unable to put our thoughts into words? It seems unlikely that thoughts should be grossly intermittent, so what barrier prevents them from being articulated?
• What happens when we understand a sentence? We are aware of understanding it, and are more aware of having failed to do so. Why can’t we follow the mental processes of comprehension as we can follow the action of tying a shoelace?

The concept of mental models derives from Craik. Johnson-Laird notes Weizenbaum’s ELIZA, but claims that it is not a simulation, but rather a dissimulation. It does not have a process of thought, but conjures thought instead. This distinction raises the contrasting idea that ELIZA matches and responds to the interactor’s model, rather than having a model of its own.

The Nature of Explanation

Most theories of cognition consist of description, and lack are not formal (in the sense of algorithmic). Johnson-Laird asks what the criteria is for a definition of cognition. This criteria, he explains, should describe theory in the form of an effective procedure. Theory must be in the form of an algorithm. This should not be a limitation in what exists in the world, but rather, what constitutes a theory that describes the world.

Later in the chapter, there is an extensive discussion of Turing machines, and explaining their universality. He is very impressed by and fascinated with the capacity for Turing machines to do any computation, and furthermore represent each other. If theories are algorithms, then they must be computable. That assertion is the claim of functionalism, to which Johnson-Laird ascribes.

The Doctrine of Mental Logic

Models are intended to replace the doctrine of mental logic, which is the propositional model of cognition. Propositional logic is a fallacious as a model for cognition because of the many logical mistakes that people make on a daily baisis. If our brains worked according to mental propositional logic, then we would be able to more readily correctly answer certain logical problems, which is clearly not the case. Johnson-Laird is not attempting to argue against logic, but rather, that there are multiple kinds of logic.

The logical problem demonstrated is case where the subjects are shown a set of cards with the symbols: [E, K, 4, 7], and told that every card has a number on one side, and a letter on the other. The subject given the generalization, “If a card has a vowel on one side then it has an even number on the other side.” The subject is then asked what cards to turn over to find out whether the generalization is true or false. (p. 30)

These simple logic problems are strongly affected by context. Context affects inference. Changing context in logical problems leads to variable results in whether people can solve the problem correctly. Certain formulations of equivalent problems are frequently solved correctly, while other formulations are frequently solved incorrectly. Familiarity generally helps performance. This argument surfaces when making the connection to embodiment and associative reasoning.

The conclusion of this section presents 6 bullet points (p. 39):

1. People make fallacious inferences.
2. Which logic is found in the mind?
3. How is logic formulated in the mind?
4. How does logic arise in the mind? (development)
5. Deduction depends on the content of the premises. When an individual is familiar with (or has a model of) a situation, they are more likely to reason about it correctly.
6. “People follow extra-logical heuristics in making inferences. They appear to be guided by the principle of maintaining the semantic content of the premises but expressing it with greater linguistic economy.” That is, when presented with propositions p and not-p or q, they are likely to conclude q, instead of p and q.

Theories of the Syllogism

Propositional logic is psychologically flawed. A more accurate logic occurs in syllogisms. Syllogisms are first order declarations: All X are Y, or some X are Y, no X are Y, etc. Johson-Laird puts forth several goals for a theory of reasoning (p. 65-66), and will later deduce that syllogisms satisfy these goals.

1. “A descriptively adequate theory must account for the evaluation of conclusions, the relative difficulty of different inferences, and the systematic errors and biases that occur in drawing spontaneous conclusions.”
2. “The theory should explain the differences in inferential ability from one individual to another.”
3. “The theory should be extensible in a natural way to related varieties of inference rather than apply solely to a narrow class of deductions.”
4. “The theory should explain how children acquire the ability to make valid inferences.”
5. “The theory must allow that people are capable of making valid inferences, that is, they are potentially rational.”
6. “The theory should shed some light on why formal logic was invented and how it was developed.”
7. “The theory should ideally have practical applications to the teaching of reasoning skills.”

How to Reason Syllogistically

In giving a description for how people might reason using syllogisms, Johnson-Laird gives an example of how syllogisms might be visualized by an individual. The syllogism is of the form, “All the artists are beekeepers, and all the beekeepers are chemists.” A way to visualise syllogisms without using a Euler circle or Venn diagram is to imagine a tableau of actors who play the parts of artists, beekeepers, and chemists. Thus, there would be artist-beekeeper-chemists, beekeeper-chemists, and a lone chemist. (p. 94) The metaphor of the tableau is useful for representing mental representations of the situation, but more telling is the use of the troupe of actors who enact these roles. This representation covertly emphasizes the cultural and embodied manner by which the syllogism is understood.

Going a step further, though. Johnson-Laird produces an algorithm for how to reason syllogistically. However, syllogistic logic is still not a complete representation of the logic that humans follow when reasoning, because we still make reasoning mistakes in complex syllogistic problems, for example: “Some B are A, no C are B” yields incorrect conclusions in almost all cases. (p. 74)

Inference and Mental Models

The key to this chapter is how to reason without rules of inference. Both propositional and syllogistic logic define rules for drawing inferences, but they do not line up to natural everyday reason. Mental models are introduced with relational expressions. These may all take the form of predicates or relational expressions. Relations are a bit heavier than ordinary propositions, but still work on the same level. At this point, all mental models are of the form of tableaus.

With the focus on tableaus, mental models can be understood as devices for association, and defining relationships. Both of these can be addressed by non-symbolic and embodied means (Lakoff and Johnson), so even though Johsnon-Laird’s formulation is intended to be computational in nature, it can be more than that.

There are some final bullet points regarding mental models:

1. The theory embraces both implicit and explicit inferences. This means that they should be able to represent all arguments.
2. Children can learn to reason before understanding rules of inference, because reason is possible without logic.
3. The theory is compatible with the fact that people can use logic.
4. It is also compatible with the historical origin of logic.

Images, Propositions, and Models

There is a conflict over how images fit into cognition and psychology. The two sides are the ‘imagists’ (Paivio, Shepard, and Kosslyn) and ‘propositionalists’ (Baylor, Pylyshyn, Palmer). Johnson-Laird argues for the encoding of images in the mind, and goes for a functional account of mental processing. This does liken the mind to a computer: it can procedurally transform images into systems of symbols.

Johnson-Laird describes the relationship between mental models and propositions. “The crucial problem for the mental language is the nature of its semantics. Propositions can refer to the world. Human beings, of course, do not apprehend the world directly; they posess an internal representation of it, because perception is the construction of a model of the world.” Thus, the mental model operates between the individual’s logic and the world itself. Any propositions in that individual’s mind must act on the model, rather than on the world directly. Models work via analogy, and images are views of models.

Meaning in Model-Theoretic Semantics

This section describes how meaning is constructed and composed (in the sense of built compositionally) in model theory. Johnson-Laird references Tarski here, in terms of understanding truth values. A big bit of this is still in terms of truth vs falsehoods. The discussion raises the issue of worlds, and how models connote not only existing meaning, but a set of potential configurations that are enabled by that model. The world of meaning enabled by a model is called its extension.

There is some discussion of Montague grammar, which is an attempted formalization of natural language. This segues into a model-based formulation of meaning, which derives neatly from mathematical logic. The following passage is dearly familiar to the theory of models in logic. “The power of model-theoretic semantics resides in its explicit and rigorous approach to the composition of meanings. It provides a theory of semantic properties and relations, e.g., a set of premises entails a conclusion if and only if the conclusion is true in every model in which the premises is true.” (p. 180)

What Is Meaning?

The discussion of meaning traverses from psychology to word meanings. THere is a great deal of philosophy and squabbling over where meanings come from, or what concepts like “water” or “jade” are, intrinsically. This entire discussion neglects the use of practice, where words and other signs may hold different meanings to different observers, under different circumstances. The importance of language meaning is critical in this treatment of mental models, because the models are based on language.

The conflict in this is between meaning Psychologism and Realism, which respectively attest that meaning is in the mind or outside of the mind. Johnson-Laird is attempting to find a middle ground in this, and looks to an encoding of meaning that allows for intersections and vagueness. However, fuzzy logic exposes the same problem. Propositions, even with values of confidence, are divorced from a knower. For language to work, the knower must have a context and a state of mind. The relative values of “tallness” (given in his example on p. 200) are only meaningful in context.

To address the question of meaning, the psychological perspective asserts that meaning is wholly in the mind, whereas the realistic perspective asserts that meaning is wholly outside of it. Johnson-Laird seems to claim that meaning works within a model, which is grounded in language, which has elements that are both inside and outside the mind. There is an added dimension of culture, though which is extremely relevant. Meanings (and models) are shared between individuals in a culture, so meaning exists beyond the individual, but also beyond the literalism of language. I would argue that it is instead a consensus. This position is not incompatible with models, but requires a reppropriation of Johnson-Laird’s use of models.

The Psychology of Meaning

Models are procedural structures that may be adjusted over time or through discourse according to some rules. There is a set of bullet points describing these:

1. “The processes by which fictitious discourse is understood are not essentially different from those that occur with true assertions.” Thus we use the same logic for processing information into models, even if we know the information is fictional or false.
2. “In understanding a discourse, you construct a single model of it.”
3. “The interpretation of discourse depends on both the model and the processes that construct, extend, and evaluate it.” The model for discourse can vary over time.
4. “The functions that construct, extend, evaluate, and revise mental models, unlike the interpretation functions of model-theoretic semantics, cannot be treated in an abstract way.” There must be some formal algorithms for changing mental models.
5. “A discourse is true if it has at least one mental model that satisfies its truth conditions that can be embedded in a model corresponding to the world.”

~~Intermezzo~~

The next couple of chapters deal with the understanding of grammar and the parsing of language into propositional expressions. There is a great deal of noun-phrase, verb-phrase stuff. The analysis of grammar is heavily extended from Chomsky.

The Coherence of Discourse

Johnson-Laird gives a surprising interjection regarding story grammars. This makes some sense given the focus in the preceeding chapters on the relationship between language grammar and models. The challenge to story grammars can be seen as a critique of a particular kind of structuralism. Earlier pages compare blocks of text that form coherent paragraphs versus those that do not. Coherency relates to consistency and discourse history, which is a type of context. Models have the formal power to use this context in a way that grammar lacks.

The Nature of Mental Models

Some properties of mental models:

1. Computability. Mental models are computable, and so are the tools for manipulating them.
2. Finitism. A mental model must be finite, and cannot directly represent an infinite domain.
3. Constructivism. A model is constructed from symbolic tokens and structurally composed.

A typology/heirarchy of models:

1. Relational. This is a finite set of tokens representing entities, a finite set of properties, and a finite set of relations connecting entities to properties.
2. Spatial. This is a relational model where the relations are spatial.
3. Temporal. A temporal model consists of frames of spatial models, that occur in a temporal order.
4. Kinematic. This is a temporal model that is psychologically continuous, there are no temporal discontinuities.
5. Dynamic. A kinematic model which relates causal relations between frames.
6. Image. The image is a viewer-centric representation of a spatial or kinematic model.

It seems to me that this formulation reverts to computational models, and begins to become severely detached from underlying psychology.

Consciousness and Computation

The final chapter works to give a formal and procedural account for consciousness. Essentially, consciousness is already computational, when understood as processing of mental models. An excuse is given here, that while cognition may be computational, other human traits, such as spirituality, morality, and imagination cannot be modeled and will “remain forever inexplicable.” This is a cop out. Johnson-Laird cannot introduce a hulking device for representing psychology and then blow off its application to other psychological traits.

There are significant critiques to be had with the computational formulation of mental models. I would argue that the computational imposition is severely flawed, but models remain invaluable as a tool for understanding cognition. The use of modeling is especially important in the representations of spirituality (cultural beliefs), morality, and imagination.