Overview

Lev Vygotsky studied developmental psychology in Soviet Russia, approaching psychology from a peculiar perspective that differed from both western scholars and his Soviet contemporaries. Vygotsky approached psychology from an almost linguistic lens and attempted to reconcile problems that he found lacking in the approaches of other psychologists. Piaget is Vygotsky’s favorite whipping boy, and much of the work is aimed at critiquing Piaget’s work, which was the widely accepted western standard. In Thought and Language, Vygotsky looks at the process of learning language in human development as being directly related to thought and consciousness. Notably, he claims that the autistic speech of the toddler evolves to become the inner speech of the adult.

Notes

Psychology is the focus: Human function vs natural or biological. The focus is on the subject, not on the theory. Vygotsky’s approach is heavily influenced by Hegel. (p. xv) Vygotsky places importance on the distinction between conscious and unconscious action, which separates him from behaviorism. (p. xvi) The challenge of consciousness: Cannot define or explain consciousness in terms of itself! Cyclical pattern is a failing of theory. Social behavior relates to consciousness. “The mechanism of social behavior and the mechanism of consciousness are the same…. We are aware of ourselves, for we are aware of others, and in the same way as we know others; and this is as it is because in relation to ourselves we are in the same [position] as others are to us.” [Lev Vygotsky, “Consciousness as a problem of Psychology of behavior,” Soviet Psychology, 1979, 17:29-30]. Connection with George Mead: Mead’s struggle with behaviorism and Vygotsky’s struggle with consciousness are similar. (p. xxiv) The idea of context is the point of contention between Vygotsky and his Soviet contemporaries, especially Zinchenko. There is conflict over semiotics and role of history. (p. xlviii)

In author’s preface: speech and inner speech are a gallery to thought, as a new theory of consciousness. (p. lxi)

Vygotsky critiques methods of analysis: elemental psychology, deconstructs psyche into elements. This approach is flawed like only looking at elements in the periodic table in chemistry (as opposed to their interaction with each other) Sounds like a conflict between unit and system, interaction and independence. (p. 4) Looking at Gestalt psychology and association psychology. Major claim: Words are generalizations: connection of language and thought. Meaning making is an act of though. Communication is a spread of affect. Communication spreads and shares feelings and sensations, a frightened goose does not tell its flock what it has seen, but spreads its fear. (p. 6-7)

Criticism of Piaget: Refusal to apply theory to evidence in effort to preserve empiricality. This leads to facts that cannot be disentangled from philosophy. (p. 15) Vygotsky begins exploring autistic thought: Autism is egocentrism. Compare with Freud and the pleasure/reality principles as difference of autistic thought and realistic thought: Desires and satisfactions. (p. 18) Egocentric speech transforms into “inner speech”, which is highly important in later intellectual development. Practically, as communicative speech, ecocentric is useless, it does not communicate, but echoes itself like a chant. (p. 33)

Speech in developing children: Communication is bodily, much more than purely verbal. Specifically looking at toddlers, words strongly accompanied by gestures, etc. (p. 65) Thought, language and speech: The development of inner speech relates to development of social speech, which is a social means of thought. (p. 95)

Studying development of concepts. Take on category: Word denotes a collection, rather than individual concept. Several things arise: Complex, category, concept. (p. 115) Collections are grouped as “diffuse complexes”. Also arise pseudoconcepts, lies between a complex and a real concept. It is like a concept, but lacks the underlying ideas that define concepts as being more than just collections. (p. 119) The conceptual approach is what GOFAI projects tend to echo, but seem to miss the complex phase that must precede it.

Theories of learning scientific concepts: Interesting due to procedural model/simulation style of thought/reasoning. Some schools of thought believe that scientific concepts have no inward history, that they do not undergo development, but are absorbed via understanding and assimilation. Vygotsky claims that when new words are learned, they are seen as primitive generalizations, and then become replaced by higher types of generalizations. Scientific concepts specifically abide by a functional nature. This seems to echo comprehension of metaphors! (p. 149) Interesting note in childhood development: Failure to understand relations. Connections and relations between concepts arise gradually. Piaget cites Claparede’s law of awareness to explain establishment of relations: Awareness of difference precedes awareness of likeness (!). Connect with analogy, proves analogy is higher stage of development. (p. 163)

Types of understanding: personal/experiential vs schematic/scientific. Some concepts are spontaneously learned, derive from experience, but do not abide by shematic rules. Scientific concepts are learned as schematics, but do not connect to experience. “One might say that the development of the child’s spontaneous concepts proceeds upward, and the development of his scientific concepts downward, to a more elementary and concrete level.” So, spontaneous concepts gradually become generalized, while scientific concepts gradually become concrete. (p. 193) A critique of Gestalt psychology: cannot just use association. Must understand development of concepts as neither associative nor structural, but based on the relations of generality. This flows to the idea of productive thinking (Max Wertheimer), this involves analogy and generalizations of concepts on high order. (p. 204)

Vygotsky distinguishes analysis by elements to analysis by units. Units are capable of retaining and expressing the essence of the whole, as opposed to elements which are intrinsically fragmentary. The essence of word meaning, which develops over time, develops based on the thinker-knower, whose knowledge changes. Association theory is inadequate to account for these larger background changes. (p. 211-213)

“Inner speech is not the interior aspect of external speech–it is a function in itself. It still remains speech, i.e., thougth connected with words. But while in external speech thoguht is embodied in words, in inner speech words die as they bring forth thought. Inner speech is to a large extend thinking in pure meanings. It is a dynamic, shifting, unstable thing, fluttering between word and thought, the two more or less stable, more or less firmly dileneated components of verbal thought. Its true nature and place can be understood only after examining the next plane of verbal thought, the one still more inward than inner speech.” The plane of thought is a space of thinking which transcends thought and speech. Concepts formed here may not have expression in language. (p. 249) Speech and thought are manifestations of motivation, are connected to various theories of motivation. Compare with Maslow, The Sims, Facade, etc. (p. 252)

Overview

Metaphor and Thought is a collection of essays about metaphor. The book is primarily concerned with linguistics, but several essays trace back to the larger problem of understanding the role of metaphor in cognition. The general questions about metaphor are: How do people create and understand metaphors? How do we understand metaphors as linguistic structures? What is the relationship between metaphorical and literal speech? Is there such a thing as literal speech? The last question raises interesting concerns about the affect and use of language in communication.

Directions

Andrew Ortony: Metaphor: A Multidimensional Problem

Literal understanding and conception of meaning reached a height with Russel 1956 and Wittgenstein 1921/1961 and the rise of logical positivism. This is opposed to relativism and “mental construction” that arose with E Sapir 1921 and Whorf 1956. The latter asserts that types and uses of language are interdependent. (p. 1) Ortony distills questions down to distinguishing metaphors from nonmetaphors? “What are metaphors?” as well as a more interesting question, “What are metaphors for?” Max Black asserts that criterion for metaphorhood is inherently flawed. Something new is created when a metaphor is understood. What is that? (p. 5) In Development, new words are understood: “open” for both window and mouth. Is this the origin of embodiment in meaning? (p. 7)

Several widely asserted theories of metaphor: interaction view, comparison view, substitution view. Each equally compatible, incompatible w actual metaphor. (p. 10)

Max Black: More about Metaphor

This paper supplements the interaction view of metaphor. There is a mysterious, conventional nature of metaphor. It is not rationalist or literal certainly. “Say one thing and mean another” but why? (p. 21) There is a reductionist standard that the literal as norm, but metaphor is playful. Linguistically, metaphor violates some rules, but some must still be met to be acceptable. Can be no dictionary of metaphors, but there can be themes. Metaphors would be HARD in NLU. There are two categories of metaphors, emphatic and resonant. Emphatic is the tone and force of the metaphor, resonance is the allusion to other broader characteristics and qualities. A strong metaphor is both resonant and emphatic. (p. 26)

Black begins deriving a vaguely mathematical model of metaphors. “Every implication complex supported by a metaphor’s secondary subject, I now think, is a model of the ascriptions imputed to the primary subject: Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model.” (p. 31) Translation and metaphorical equivalence…

Jerrold M. Sadock: Figurative Speech and Linguistics

Problem of linguistics: Form vs meaning. Linguistics seeks to make explicit the relationship between them. This is not possible without understanding what sentences mean. (p. 52) Sadock introduces a mathematical notion of semantics. U_c(E)=>P is the utterance of E on some occasion c. Where P is a porposition that is implied or conveyed. Sadock introduces confidence in implication logic, forming some implicative logic system. (p. 59)

L. Jonathan Cohen: The Semantics of Metaphor

Discussion of metaphor and its relation to language. Is metaphor independent of language? What are the mechanics of metaphor? “analogical urge” Problem of langue vs parole. Cohen introduces a great many examples of metaphors and examines the possible meanings and complex relationships thereof. (p. 65) Cohen introduces a property attribution style of analysis. That is, some features are attributed, while others are canceled. (+update, +cylindircal, etc). Metaphor cancels some propositions. But enables, alludes to a larger set. This sounds like semantic networking. (p. 70)

David E. Rumelhart: Some Problems with the Notions of Literal Meanings

Rumelhart challenges the very notion of literal speech in this paper. Performing an analysis of Searle and Sadock, figurative language is integral to learning, it is intuitive and natural. The difference between figurative and “conventional” or literal language is very hazy, usually there is overlap of some kind. (p. 78) “The traditional program of semantic analysis (cf. Katz & Fodor) provides a set of meanings for the individual lexemes of the language and then provides a set of rules of composition whereby the individual meanings of the lexemes are combined to form the meaning of the sentence.” These combined lexemes form the literal meanings of sentences, and form the set of literal sentences. This approach is lacking due to the inflexibility of meaning. (p. 81) There are several approaches to addressing metaphor: 1) Reject the traditional program of semantics and forma new account of literal and conveyed meanings. 2) Retain traditional program, but assume metaphor and other cases of figurative are accountable by another theory altogether. 3) Assume traditional theory works fine for most cases, but additional processing is required for violations. 4) Modify traditional theory to make it work for metaphor as well as literal language. Sadock has opted for (3), and Cohen for (4), but Rumelhart asserts that neither are valid and whole theory must be torn down and reconstructed to account for metaphor. Dominant theories are suspect. Some interesting issues to follow: NLU and representation, psychological analysis of human understanding (accounting for figurative) (p. 82)

Metaphor depends on our background, real world understanding, does not rely on logical order of lexemes. Even literal sounding statements require context in order to be processed and understood correctly, since many details are ambiguous or possible to misinterpret. Spoken words are gnomon. (p. 84) A process oriented model of cognition: Evaluate, hypothesize, search. (Sounds like SOAR) (p. 87)

John R. Searle: Metaphor

George Miller’s mathematical/linguistic approach to metaphor. Uses first order logic formula of property attribution. (p. 110) Searle outlines 8 principles of metaphor using some of the propositional approach. (p. 116) Searle finally creates some helpful graphs of meanings, expressing specifically various types of metaphors and how they relate to sentence and utterance meanings; literal utterance, metaphorical utterance (simple), metaphorical utterance (open ended), ironical utterance, dead metaphor, and indirect speech act.

Samuel R. Levin: Standard Approaches and Literary Metaphors

Levin describes a mapping graph accounting for the metaphorical construction, between the linguistic and phenomenalistic constructural transformations. (p. 132)

Allan Paivio: Psychological Processes in the Comprehension of Metaphor

The question at the bottom here: Matter of why, not as workaround, but as integral portion of understanding. (p. 151) Skinner: generalization of stimulus-response; metaphor is related to “abstractive seeing” as visual imagery. (p. 156) Paivio examines dual coding of imagery and verbal associations, finding some sort approach to memory. Dual coding uses visual terms, but could be extended to embodiment in general. (p. 163)

George A. Miller: Images and Models, Similies and Metaphors

Miller starts by addressing comprehension issues, and addresses metaphor as an apperceptive problem. He claims that when we hear “x is y” then we must imagine a world in which x is y. This seems to be curious and flawed reasoning. (p. 213) Miller later extends Searle’s first order model of linguistics to one resembling lambda calculus. This resembles Cyc and other AI style modeling, using relational models. Several types of metaphors are examined using this approach, nominal metaphors, predicative metaphors, and sentenial metaphors. This forms some sort of peculiar replacement logic. (p. 231) Finally, Miller examines metaphor recognition as a functional interpretation of lexemes. This model may potentially have some helpful uses. (p. 239) This also uses a symbol-object view on literal terms and meanings. (p. 247)

Richard Boyd: Metaphor and Theory Change: What is “Metaphor” a Metaphor for?

Boyd here uses metaphor as an approach to examine theory. Different theories have their own languages, and employ metaphors in context and frame specific ways of expressing meaning. Metaphor applies to symbol representation in science, metaphors are constitutive of the theories that they express. Some examples, “thought is a kind of information processing, and the brain is a sort of computer”, or “certain motoric or cognitive processes are pre-programmed”, etc… (p. 360) Logical positivism claims that relevant qualities of objects are defined by sensation (phenomenological perception) rather than verbal description. (p. 366) Metaphor is bound up in the notion of reference, and it is necessary to define a theory of nondefinitional reference to deal with referentiality, ambiguity, and linguistic precision. (p. 377)

Boyd spends some time on how to approach a theory of reference: reference is an epistemological notion, since semantic theory is a branch of epistemology. “A causal theory of reference is true precisely because reference is an epistemological notion and causal theory of knowledge is true.” Reference must be thougth of as dynamic and dialectical (as opposed to synchronic, piecemeal, and nondialectical): Changes in language do not represent changes of reference. This becomes study of reference by means of “epistemic access”. (p. 381)

Overview

This text is a sociological approach to studying interactions. Its ostensible goal is to understand what sorts of interactions take place among people. The authors follow both Manford H. Kuhn and George Mead in the tradition of symbolic interaction. This work attempts to break down interactions and their dynamics into individuals, roles, identities, boundaries, and agenda. Their approach intends to be general, but has a tendency to focus on western subjects. The most promising finding of this work is the idea of the “role”, which seems to be very adaptable to a model of simulation.

Notes

Interaction is a base requirement for “humanness”. Begin looking at fundamental questions: Who, what, when, where, how, why. The focus of this research is on interactions from the perspective of the individual and not the larger social system. A point of conflict is scientism vs humanism, evidenced by western dualism. (p. 2) Rational thinking vs unconscious behavior: Strategic action is not necessarily conscious. Interesting source to look at: Manford H. Kuhn “Major Trends in Symbolic Interaction Theory in the Past Twenty-Five Years”. (p. 5) Some initial concepts: Role (Conformity, performance, improvisation), Self, Self Evaluation. (p. 6) On Self: Not reflexive, but directive. Each of these is heavily researched, as evidenced in the footnotes. Interpersonal school, self theory, exchange theory (economic model of self, allocation). “It is our view that the importance of the self lies not in its reflexive churnings and seethings but in its directive influence on human behavior.” (p. 8) Searching for an “interactionist” theory: Focusing on four dependent/effect variables: Who, why, when, where. Resembles dramatic framework of Kenneth Burke: Agent, Act, Scene, Agency (discussed in “Grammar of Motives”). This is not (supposedly) directly related, but seems relevant generally. (p. 12)

Stated task for work: Explain w’s for selection set: What actions may be empirically actualized? (p. 15) Even culture has preferred w’s to study or emulate, ideas of standard acceptable behaviors. It is important to identify and find how the subject domain is both limited and varied. (p. 24) Social boundaries and categories are ascribed and achieved. There are permeability of actions across boundaries, but these have biased permeability. Social group with higher power has freedom to transgress boundaries, but keep others out. (p. 27) Boundaries give way to an interaction-opportunity structure, model for interactions. Boundaries impede individuals, and have cost to cross. But there are perceived opportunities, so the cost and reward structure gives way to a game/economic dynamic. Knowing yields contextual knowledge of self-situation among others. One can be dissatisfied with one’s self-situation for knowledge of something better. (p. 37)

The bridge between mechanism and idealism: animal vs rational. Division between this is embarrassing and yeilds confusion, anxiety, ambivalence. It seems though, that this conflict seems more emblematic of western philosophy. The conflict of dual nature leads to a great deal of confusion and conflict, forcing man to make decisions without knowing consequences, which lies at the base of tragedy and comedy. Reality is shared in social system, and constructed through interaction. “Reality, then, in this distinctively human world, is not a hard immutable thing but is fragile and adjuciated–a thing to be debated, compromised, and legislated.” (p. 42)

A look at Mead’s theory of social acts and social objects: Any act consists of an impulse, stimulus, and response. The thing (stimulus) becomes an object by being enacted. This is a special and somewhat unconventional use of language that looks at actions and behavior in an insightful way. (p. 50) Identity is the set of perspectives and attitudes on the acting self. It appraises, evaluates, and monitors. Another take on action is dramaturgy (Goffman, Burke), which breaks things down to character, role, and audience. The self is a performance. (p. 57)

A step by step study of planning and interactions: 1) Man is a planning animal. 2) Things take on meanings in relation to plans. 3) We act toward things in terms of their meaning for our plan of action. 4) Therefore, we must identify every thing we encounter and discover its meaning. 5) For social plans of action, these meanings must be consensual. 6) The basic thing to be identified in any situation is the person himself. [Character] Symbolic interaction links things and objects. (p. 60-62)

Role identities and daydreams: Rehearsal for performances. Similar to goal based planning, but seems intrinsically different. A role identity is an imagined suite of devices for one in a particular social position. It’s a view of oneself as one would like to think of oneself being and acting as an occupant of that position. Roles are highly abstract constructs, and most are imaginary or unrealized. Roles must be shared and consensual to be accepted socially. This is done via performances, one performs a role, so it is reciprocated and supported by others. There is a balance between conventional and idiosyncratic performances (latter occurring within one’s “inner forum”). (p. 70) Roles must have audiences to be legitimized. This is role support. Audience is specific to role itself. Without role support, legitimacy, actuality of role decays over time, leading to an undermining of identity (which seems to be a trend in postmodernism). (p. 75)

Roles are separated, operate and parallel. The cluster, but clusters may be conflicted and dissociated. Roles operate in a heirarchy of prominence. Each role grants its performer various extrinsic and intrinsic rewards or gratifications. Most of these come from others (the audience) via the support and performance. (p. 77) Some interesting issues emerge from this flow: What of undesired roles? “drunk”, “failure”, or performances that may be interpreted poorly by different audience members. Ie, whining could produce either sympathy or loathing. There is a strata of actualization: “writer” vs “writer wannabe” which seems to occur as a spectrum of how roles are perceived by different audiences. Role prominence strongly informs decision making. (p. 83) Value and satisfaction planning model: Important is the notion of perceived opportunities. This seems to be treading dangerously close to goal and planning oriented AI and such thinking. (p. 85)

Context works in application to evaluation of performance self. The audience/self expectation and appraisal must sacrifice some expectations to fulfill others. There is a difference between the real and idealized self/performer. (p. 93) Legitimization is only necessary when a discrepancy is large or frequent. A discrepancy is a difference between expected role-identity support and actualized support. Reconciliation patterns are: Selective perception (dismiss some discrepancies, impose a border between noise and intention in performance), Selective interpretation (reinterpretation of the audience’s response), Rationalization (explaining away discrepancies, as arising from unimportant or external causes), Scapegoating (blaming another for the failure, due to their failure in counterroles), Deprecation of audience (the audience does not understand the role and its opinions are of no merit), Disavowal (the performance with discrepancy is not relevant to role identity). These patterns of justification are interesting in their nature of human rationalization and cognitive dissonance. (p. 95-99)

Selective and functional understanding of things [images of objects], interpretation and being interpreted, are active processes. Perception and recoding resembles semiotic analysis. (p. 107) There are culturally relevant means of perception. Perception is a learned contextualized cultural skill. Reflection on Nouveau Riche as matter of cultural perception of goods and tastes. (p. 111) Stereotyping is a means of generalizing, it simplifies individuals/things into categories. A category is characteristic, it has properties, but it is also functional. Stereotypes are relevant to different groups in their functional characteristics: compare stereotype of policeman to square vs hippie. Stereotyping; “It is an inherent and inevitable aspect of every human appraisal of every person encountered.” (p. 115) Stereotype and reputation. Stereotype: social identity, Reputation: personal identity. SOUNDS LIKE GURPS!!! Status/Reputation. Both shape and mold each other. (p. 117)

Knowledge of others is flawed. We cannot truly (metaphysically) know someone, but there is a minimum necessary to do so. There is a wide chasm between minimum and complete. The authors define some processes in which perceptions are formed and reinforced. This turns to reinforcing cycles (p. 123):

1. Ego makes an inference about Alter.
2. Ego acts toward Alter in terms of this inference.
3. Alter makes inferences about Ego in terms of his action.
4. Alter tends to react toward Ego in terms of his inference.
5. Thus Ego’s influences tend to be confirmed by Alter’s actions.

There are a multitude of situations under which interactions may occur. Under conflict [collision] some protocol must be established. Conflict is conflict between role identities, which one must be used in a given circumstance. This must be resolved seamlessly, hence the use of ritual. (p. 129) Roles are perceived in people. People perform a line of action (as in Goffman). The goal is to discern motives. Different groups understand actions to indicate motives in varying senses. Motives are deduced via projection of self onto others’ roles. This approach is totally different from the standard model of communication, which is transmission of ideas, this approach is much more internal, wherein agents attempt to discern motives (or the role they would desire Ego to have) of others and react accordingly. (p. 132) Roles are negotiated and determined via a working agreement between interactors. This cycle defines roles for both parties, via interpretaive and presentative processes. There is a neat graph on this page of the dynamics of interactions. “A working agreement can be said to exist when the cognitive processes of one person, with respect to social identities are not in gross conflict with the expressive process of the other person.” (p. 142). Example of this sort of dynamic occurs when a man and woman are wavering between being friends and more than friends, roles are presented, cast, altercast, responded to, etc.

Role of power in interactions: occurs when imbalance of “resources” that is, gratification of tasks [interactions]. An “operator” is one who uses and manipulates others knowing the rules of social exchange. (p. 160) Some types of multi-person encounters: 1) conflict of roles, 2) simultaneous performances, 3) central performances. In these, roles and interactions are performed and negotiated, have a tendency to drift towards a low energy states (break off into single interactions, where there aren’t conflicts). (p. 162)

Features that drive interpersonal relationships: Reward dependability, Ascription, Commitment, Investment, Attachment. These features also relate to relationship formation. The model here is an economic one, balancing various features rewards for other qualities. (p. 170) Some sentimental characteristics of relationships [perceived in eyes of agents]: Uniqueness, Intimacy, Consecration, Purity of Reciprocity. These are qualities that agents see in their relationship that makes it special. (p. 177) Some juicy bits here: How relationships are formed: Initiation of relationships, first encounters, selection of role or persona[s] for such encounters. Subset of personas may be applied, but how big a subset? (p. 181) Concealment of roles in relationships: Some roles may be hidden or concealed. Sometimes these slip up. Some relationships need or depend on limitation of roles/personas. This leads to covertness and multiplication of identity. May be simple or serious: A poet in a workaday environment, vs a homosexual in a strained marriage. (p. 191)

Roles are learned, anticipatory socialization in development. Children “play at” roles. Play relates to role learning, seems to relate to concept formation as well (inasmuch as roles are concepts). Denaturalization vs system learning as roles and performances. (p. 210) Role identities are observed, fantasized, then change or evolve and are made more realistic. Being vs Being Like. Relates to changes in perception, as perceptions grow and evolve over development and over time in general (Connect Vygotsky.) Are roles changed or destroyed or recreated? (p. 215)

In logistics of identity, there is an economic model of what roles to perform based on the relative rewards to be gained vs costs of performance. Relative worth of actions from different roles, gratifications are highly relative. The economic model here must be stochastic. Interesting things happen when individuals overestimate, or underestimate roles and costs. (p. 238) Agenda construction and negotiation of relationships: there are scales and scopes of agendas, long and short. Relationship between them is problematic, when is an agenda short term vs long term? (p. 246)

The authors seem to have used some survey questions to elicit data from respondents. The effectiveness is curious, but there is a nice distribution of questions: 1) Average past degree of self-support. 2) Average past degree of social support. 3) Average past degree of intrinsic gratification. 4) Average past degree of extrinsic gratification. 5) Average past degree of commitment. 6) Average past degree of investment. Each question could be applied to various abstracted roles. (p. 265)

Overview

Weizenbaum’s 1976 influential text reflects a growing concern over the philosophical ramifications of artificial intelligence. Weizenbaum is specifically concerned with the interpretation of his Eliza program, and its characteristic of its simplistic processing being mistaken for the wisdom of an actual human psychotherapist. Weizenbaum argues that this is indicative of a larger problem, wherein the application of science and technology (and computer science specifically) is reducing humans to be equated to machines. Weizenbaum argues against the development of AI, not because AI cannot achieve its goals, but because AI should not achieve its goals.

Notes

The computer is a vehicle that is making the world into a computer. Weizenbaum’s initial concern seems very similar to Hidegger’s question concerning technology. Weizenbaum also interacted with Daniel Denett in fleshing out his ideas.

Eliza is not embodied but begins with cultural conceptual knowledge. (at least pretends to have such knowledge). Weizenbaum’s schocks on public reception of Eliza: 1) Model of therapy (that could be made artificial) 2) Antropomorphization of computer. 3) Over crediting of limited text processing power. (p. 5)

Weizenbaum’s concerns and questions: 1) Man as recognized as/equated to clockwork. 2) Role of instrumentality (Freud ref about man being how like a god with his prosthetic). 3) Human trust and autonomy (machines diminish autonomy with dependence). What is the retrospective modern audience take on these? (pp. 8-9) Weizenbaum sees a dogmatic, rationalist perspective seen in colleagues and students. These cultural embedded perceptions persist to this day. (p. 10)

Consider Judaic tradition of the contract between God and man. Depends on free action, decision making of both parties. With rationalistic perspective, truth is equated to provability. Science is a drug and slow acting poison. (p. 12)

Behaviorist ref to B.F. Skinner: human values are illusory. Consider comparison to embedded nature of value in linguistic/semiotic systems. (p. 14) Weizenbaum introduces theatre as a school “The Greek and Oriental theatres, the Shakespearian stage, the stages peopled by the Ibsens and Checkhovs nearer to our day–these were schools. The curricula they taught were vehicles for understanding the societies they represented.” Weizenbaum is looking at this from a cultural study perspective. (p. 16)

Weizenbaum discusses tools, as extensions of people. Tools are imaginative extensions, but limited by imagination. Tool informs and alters user’s perception of world. (p. 18) The computer has closed some doors while it opened others. Weizenbaum’s fear of computer as a tool is technological determinist in nature. Technology changes people who use it. People have become over-confident in the computer’s ability to solve problems, and under-confident in themselves. (p. 38)

Weizenbaum discusses power of machines as regular, lawful entities. “Machines, when they operate properly, are not merely law abiding; they are embodiments of law.” We have faith of the law in the computer. We defer our laws and knowledge to the law of the computer. (p. 40) Uses logic of games to describe state and rules in systems. Weizenbaum uses some abstract examples- greed is not a rule, but implicit law embedded in Monopoly. Other games may be more abstract, but still encode rules and embody laws. (p. 44)

Some complexity theory here: also, matter of translatability of X into an algorithm for representing X. Translatability is directly related to simulation. This relates to notion of a formal description “effective procedure”, but glosses over ideas of subtext or nuance. “Can anything we may wish to do be described in terms of an effective procedure”: No (p. 65) Natural langauge encodes grammatical validity (p. 69)

Baudrillard ref here: Representation is equated to the subject. Semiotic simulation implies that boundary between is blurred. (p. 106) Process of programming, defining a model is two-sided: writing/programming reveals flaws in our logic, we cannot conceal them via ambiguity as in natural language. Programming may also be used to explore ideas and come to understand a subject. (p. 108)

Computers are physically embodied, but playing at ideas in a purely cognitive realm. Computer does not understand what it is doing. The underlying references of the reason are lost on it. (p. 112) The solitary power of the lone programmer: Comparison to compulsive gambling is reminiscent of Alison Adam’s discussion of male programmer mating with female program. “The computer programmer, however, is a creator of universes for which he alone is the lawgiver. So, of course, is the designer of any game. But universes of unlimited complexity can be created in the form of computer programs. Moreover, and this is a crucial point, systems so formulated and elaborated act out their programmed scripts. They compliantly obey their laws and vividly exhibit their obedient behavior. No playwright, no stage director, no emperor, however powerful, has ever exercised such absolute authority to arrange a stage or a field of battle and to command such unswervingly dutiful actors or troops.” (p. 115)

Weizenbaum derives a slick comparison between the compulsive programmer and the compulsive gambler. Both blind themselves to realistic laws and prefer to live in their own artificial domains. (p. 124-125)

Weizenbaum explores the ambitions of the AI project, namely to extend and handle any problem that could be solved by a human. At least, AI should be “nothing less than to build a machine whose linguistic behavior, to say the least, is to be equivalent to that of humans.” (p. 138)

Wezenbaum explores the differences between theories and models. Theory is limited to the textual nature of the theory. Models may be said to satisfy theories. Computers enable alternate linguistic expression of theory via programming. (p. 144) Computer models enable immediacy and response in validation of theory, but also let pass the indeterminability of false premises, and concealment of fault. (p. 152)

AI attempts to replicate how people solve problems. Huristics and problem solving methods are protocols for understanding subjects to be modeled. Can reduce all problems to be approached by one possibly faulty model. This is description of Newell and Simon’s work, which we know is somewhat gender biased (more about how young male college students solve problems). (p. 169) Behaviorist model treats human model as a black box. Skinner refuses to look inside the black box, whereas the AI theory sees the inside of the black box as a computer to be replicated. (p. 175)

The transformation of problems into technical ones: the application of FPS machine and objective treatment on human subjects. (p. 180) The method of scripting the interactor to some extent preps and pre-programs human interactor. Compare with Alice chatterbot movement (p. 188)

AI has: confusion of intelligence with IQ, and the neglect of other modes of intelligence. (p. 205) Sum here is a deeper emphasis on the depth of human knowledge and the extreme limitation of the computer. The limits of computers should be thought in terms of “Oughts”. (p. 226)

Most successful programs are built on heuristics, not theory. This is notable in application of games such as SimCity, Sims, etc. Computer programs are based on strategies that seem to work under most unforeseen circumstances, as opposed to strong theory. (p. 232) The capacity of the computer through closed-ness can re-create history. Like Baudrillard, but applied. When computer is applied to war, it introduces tremendous dehumanization and distance between ones making decisions and the ones in battle. Weizenbaum implicates computer as device which lead to terrible waste of life and destruction in Vietnam. (p. 239) Common viewpoint holds persistent confidence and sense of inevitability of machines. Professor J. W. Forrester: Our social systems are no utopias. (p. 247)

Weizenbaum argues: “But I argue that rationality may not be separated from intuition and feeling. I argue for the rational use of science and technology, not for its mystification, let alone abandonment. I urge the introduction of ethical thought into science planning. I combat the imperialism of instrumental reason, not reason.” (p. 256)

What is a human voluntary act? Is voluntary nature illusory? Machines cannot be voluntary since they follow rules, but what is human voluntary process? If we believe Herbert Simon, we are non-voluntary, merely reacting to our environments. (p. 260) “An individual is dehumanized whenever he is treated as less than a whole person.” But, how would it be possible to treate someone as whole? Through technology or otherwise? (p. 266) Final ought of computer science projects: “… there are some human functions for which computers ought not to be substituted. It has nothing to do with what computers can or cannot be made to do. Respect, understanding, and love are not technical problems.”

Overview

Adam explores Artificial Intelligence from a feminist perspective and critiques current AI projects as being heavily masculinist. She surveys the field of AI paying close attention to its history and its various developments and how the gradual growth of the field has come to reinforce this highly gendered perspective. The danger in the male dominated growth of AI is that the AI project attempts to capture human reason, and through the neglect of feminist perspective, the reflection of humanity that AI provides is very lacking. Adam also critiques the process and approach of AI, exposing some of its flaws as a representative system.

Notes

The key word in the application of masculinist ideology into AI is inscription: AI is inscribed with gender, and it must be read to be revealed. (p. 11) AI has a culture that is in conflict over certain issues: science vs engineering, cognitive vs computer science. AI is virtual: study of non-physical objects. Artifacts are non-present.

Keith Grint and Rosalind Gill 1995: Feminist analyses exist between serving masculinity and technology vs acknowledging the force of masculinity and patriarchy. Studies which assume terms of masculinity and patriarchy without explanation tend to essentialist claims. (p. 17) Pushing women into technology indicates sexual politics: assumes neutrality of institutions (p. 19) Exploring gender as female implies that male is norm: masculinity is neutral while gender is socially constructed. Harraway: Sex and gender are a complicated systems. (p. 22)

AI is inscribed with gender. AI concerned with knowledge and simulation of knowledge. Subject of knowledge teeters between visible and invisible. The subject is the one who actually knows and is doing the knowing, which is usually omitted from AI study, usually assumed as male standard. (p. 29) Nagel 1986 critiques epistemology and propositional knowledge: “view from nowhere”. In propositional logic (S knows p) ‘S’ is universal and perspectiveless. Gilbert Ryle 1963: Knowing what vs knowing how. (p. 30) WWK or Women’s Ways of Knowing contrasts with women’s epistemology, but forms an essentialist text.

Adam reviews AI in the context of its development. There is still the persistent perception of AI as creating artificial minds, fraught with conflicts of thinking vs doing, building vs understanding. The history here focuses on the original tasks of AI. (p. 34) The underlying tools used to build AI are: search, predicate logic, decision making, heuristics, state traversal, “bounded rationality”, and planning. These approaches relate to work done by researchers in the 1950s, and excludes affairs that might be taken up by women. It was not a deliberate choice to venerate male reason, but rather it was the natural choice for researchers. (p. 36)

AI is about framing: symbolic AI interlinks with Saussure’s semiotics. Investigate Zenon Pylyshyn’s “Computation and Cognition”: work supporting GOFAI (p. 38) Representational knowledge frames employ real world– or interpretation of it. Knowledge vs stereotype. AI confuses representation of simplified model with real world that supposedly informs model.

Adam investigates connectionist networks (neural networks) as opposed to symbolic systems. These seem less ideologically steeped in male reasoning, but still depend on simulation, and still must be told what to do. (p. 45)

Adam reviews philosophical critiques (and other critiques of AI. She is very careful to do so in context and focus of what AI is and is trying to accomplish. AI can never be framed as a philosophical test. (p. 48) Searle critiques AI on basis of “intentionality”, which is some sort of human response (Chinese Room). Dennett critiques this argument based on total impossibility/implausibility of argument. (pp. 51-52) Dennett: computer acts as an intentional way insofar as it may be interpreted to do so. Phenomenological critique of AI: Dreyfus: computer cannot know how. Rule following leads to infinite regress, depends on “what we are”. This is one perspective that can be linked to the feminist critique without too much extension. (p. 55)

AI issues are: representation, intentionality, agency, and culture.

Finding the knowing subject/ knower in Cyc and Soar against a universalist perspectiveless viewpoint. Losing the knower preserves the conservative masculine “normality” and deflects responsibility. Knowing implies Responsibility! Considering traditional epistemologies: * implicit individualism, * absence of identity, * non-wierdness, * cultural imperialism. (p. 70) Subjective knowledge and consistency: Weirdness is non-beholden to standards in masculinist perception (ie, white, middle class, rational, academic culture) (p. 74)

Working from feminist epistemology: The anonymity of the inventor/scientist promotes technological imperialism “a technology appears”. Critiques great man theory, but grants anonymity of the author, who is given additional power through implicit assumption that technology is natural development. The subject “we” must be enacted, not given. (p. 77) Self knowledge and awareness demands a cultural/contextual knowledge/awareness. (p. 78) Responsibility and judgment: knower as participant vs total objectivity. Classical idealized knower is objective and detached, external to the world’s history: forms AI’s development as rooted in classical epistemology. Responsibility of agents (moral agents) is autonomous or by design?

Cyc project: Implies universality of subjects. Knowledge held is supposed to be common to everyone. Compare subject of Cyc with (for example) Wikipedia. How does Cyc cope with beliefs? Are beliefs necessary? How are they different from common sense? Mary Hesse: Observations themselves are mediated by other theories. (p. 85) Assumes universality, common denomination for decisions. Cyc implies authority, non-subjective nature. Implies normality: “healthy, sane, non-babies” who decides health and sanity? (p. 90)

Soar built from GPS (generalized problem solver). Soar meant as a candidate for a “unified theory of cognition”. The problem still is that it is a view from somewhere- that being male college students, aiming for “unnatural” problems. (p. 94)

Critique of objective reasoning: There should be plurality of voice in problem solving, a sharing of responsibility. Compare the independent Cartesian man of Reason with collectivist responsibility. (p. 98)

Language and AI: There is a symbolic order of language. Derrida identifies three isms in symbol-value systems relating to rationalist take on world: Logocentrism (supremacy of spoken word), Phallocentrism: “denotes a unitary drive toward a single, ostensibly reachable goal” (Tong 1994. p222), Dualism: way everything framed as binary oppositions. (p. 107) Knowing how vs knowing that underlies phenomenology. Knowing is inseparable from being. Attempting to separate them is Cyc’s failure: reduces the state of being into “somatic primitives” (p. 115) Focus of Cyc is knowledge, focus of Soar is architecture. In both, poor choice of problem leads to faulty theory. (p. 127)

Concerning embodiment, can assent with Andy Clark. Rationalist view denies the body. (p. 129) Lakoff critiques the objectivist perspective of AI and computation. The stance of experientialism wants to know why human conceptual system is why it is. The mind as machine perspective cannot cope with the manner in which different conceptual systems are organized: these assume equivalence occurs when one system may be translated into another. (p. 133) in Embodiment and A-Life: control is still limited by behaviorist notions of importance. Helmreich 1994 explores the subtext of A-Life: as an attempt to create life in-silico. Works like creation stories wherein masculine god (aka male programmer), breathes life into female program to create digital life. (p. 152) A-Life situation still has an absence of real human need or meaning, and an absence of social situatedness for populace of environments. Usually evolutionary programs/robots are aimed at competition, mating, creating some sort of economy or trade, but do not have any fun. These societies tend to be developed on basis of fitness and competition, and do not represent the larger social situation. (p. 154)

Adam questions what form a feminist AI project might have. Would it look any different? Built with the classical masculinist tools, could it work any differently? How could feminist programmers radically subvert AI? Ref to Mulvey and Film? (p. 157) The depth and personal situation in language and behavior is deep in human interaction. How to express reception or expectation or understanding, ambiguity or subtlety in AI or in simulated world? These are still lacking even from projects such as The Sims. (p. 162)

A distressing image here: Helmreich cites Hayles: “A male programmer mating with a female program to create a progeny whose biomorphic diversity surpasses the father’s imagination.” Adam continues: “The desires are to make the body obsolete, to play god in artificial worlds, and to download minds into robots. Such desires are predicated on the assumption that if a machine contains the contents of a person’s mind then it is that person. The body does not matter; it can be left behind.”

Overview

Geertz approaches culture from an anthropological perspective. This book is a collection of various essays attempting to find a more universal understanding of human culture and nature. Geertz concludes that semiotics and symbolic action is the means for interpreting cultures effectively, since cultures are symbol systems, and actions are symbolic in of themselves.

Notes

Geertz opens with the claim that the interpretation of culture is semiotic in nature. Culture is a web of significance. (p. 5) Ethnography is “thick description”, an accounting of facts. Explicating events is to interpret them, but analysis is an interpretation of the signs, codes, and meaning. Culture is an active document. (p. 9) Anthropological understanding of a culture “consists of whatever it is that one has to know or believe to in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members.” The issue is to bridge cultures identify the causes of conflict and integration. Culture and understanding (or a lack thereof): Wittgenstein claims that we cannot totally understand one another. This is true, but culture is a public meaning and a common interpretation of relevant symbols. (p. 13)

The goal of generalization in cultural interpretation: it is not to generalize across boundaries, but within them. This uses clinical inference to deduct cultural model. Analyze signifiers, predict outcomes, etcetera. This model is EXTREMELY similar to analysis of simulatable models. Treats symbol system as simulatable. (p. 26) The matter of generalizing: in trying to find a universal theory of culture in frame of specific cultures. No true universal generalizations are possible. (p. 40)

Some evolutionary emergence of cultural rituals and meanings: Man as evolved is “unfinished”. Culture completes this picture. “To supply the additional information necessary to be able to act, we were forced, in turn, to rely more and more heavily on cultural sources– the accumulated fund of significant symbols. Such symbols are thus not mere expressions, instrumentalities, or correlates of our biological, psychological, and social existence; they are prerequisites of it. Without men, no culture, certainly; but equally, and more significantly, without culture, no men.” (p. 49) The anthropological take on cognition: Overt, public thought vs internal thought. Compare with Vygotsky. (p. 76) Primarily, thinking is social and overt, requiring objective (in sense of Mead) things. Internal thinking is secondary! (p. 83)

Looking at religion: A bullet point summary: (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the mods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. Treated as a special meaning system. Is this different from other cultural practices? (p. 90) Cultural models are “of” and “for”. Both approaches to models are essentially equivalent, but are viewed in different lights. To make something understandable, one uses a model “of” reality, to provide guidance and instruction, one uses a model “for” reality. (p. 93) Moods and motivations (actions), compare with Vygotsky and Goffman. Moods/actions are imbued with significance and made meaningful by cultural frame. (p. 97) The role of religion in social support: Stabilizes a metaphysical anxiety or confusion. Apathy applies to many things, but certain ones require stability. For instance, the unsolvability of some mathematical axioms was deeply troubling to Russell; this is the sort of anxiety that religion soothes. (p. 100) Religion and suffering: Religion does not teach how to avoid suffering, but how to suffer. The way to suffer and endure hardship is a type of anxiety or unease for which ritual is needed. This is sort of an instructive process. Compare w Goffman and Freud. (p. 104)

In Chapter 6, Ritual and Social Exchange: A Javanese Example, Geertz explains an incident in which the standard ritual process for an ordinarily simple scenario in Javanese culture transformed instead to a huge unsettling debacle. This phenomenon occurred because of large changes to social allegiances and confusion over the ritual process in the particular Javanese village Geertz was working in. The classic functional theory of sociology is inadequate to account for the change of history and culture. Functional theory treats sociological and cultural practices as equivalent, and does not account for how one can change the other. (p. 143) Social and political differences cause complex failure of cultural rite. Changing cultural conditions leave people confused or unprepared for situations. Ritual is normally employed for transgressions, but the failure of ritual leads to mayhem. (p. 163) This is especially telling given Goffman on embarrassment. The cause of this incident traces to a single source: “an incongruity between the cultural framework of meaning and the patterning of social interaction, an incongruity due to the persistence in an urban environment of a religious symbol system adjusted to peasant social structure.” Functionalism fails to discriminate logical-meaningful with causal-functional integration. (p. 169)

On ideology: Geertz poses Mannheim’s paradox: Cannot have a non-evaluative study of ideology. That is, it is not possible to describe an ideology without evaluating it in the context of the presenter’s own ideology. This is an interesting example in of itself. Mannheim was a utopian writer and sociologist “Ideological analysis is always produced by a subject who in turn is subject to the same ideological scrutiny she performs on others.”– Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia p 76-77. In attempting to study an ideology of a culture, we need a mechanism to study meaning. (p. 196)

Theories to describe ideological resolution in culture: interest theory and strain theory. Interest theory sees ideology as Machiavellian in nature , strain theory sees things as a stress minimization problem (p. 202). Both are weak for their refusal to find symbolic formulation of ideology. (p. 207) “Whatever their other differences, both so-called cognitive and so-called expressive symbols or symbol-systems have, then, at least one thing in common: they are extrinsic sources of information in terms of which human life can be patterened–extrapersonal mechanisms for the perception, understanding, judgment, and manipulation of the world. Culture patterns–religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological–are ‘programs’; they provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes, much as genetic systems provide such a template for the organization of organic processes.” (p. 216) Ideologies render incomprehensible situations as being meaningful. Ideology explains what something is (good, bad, etc) via its symbolic association. (p. 220) Classically, this is the example where ideology saves individuals from thinking about things. But thinking really is just consideration of multiple ideologies and manipulating them symbolically.

Culture and computer programs! Geertz talks about computer programs as systems which could be analogous to cultural systems, in as much as models may be described as symbolic blueprints. However, his take is somewhat dubious: suggesting that such a model is dependent on the degree wherein social systems can be rendered in ways that are more than metaphors. (p. 250) METAPHOR connection here is interesting, does Geertz think that this sociology is primarily metaphorical in nature? This viewpoint- that a programmatic construction is possible, seems to be espoused by Talcott Parsons, a neofunctionalist. “The workability of the Parsonian concept of culture rests almost entirely on the degree to which such a model can be constructed–on the degree to which the relationship between the development of symbol systems and the dynamics of social process can be circumstantially exposed, thereby rendering the depiction of technologies, rituals, myths, and kinship terminologies as man-made information sources for the directive ordering of human conduct more than a metaphor.” For Parsons, ideology is a special sort of symbol system.

An anthropological riddle: We wish to understand that culture which is untainted by Western influence, but we cannot understand or communicate with said culture without some influence that we might know their language and communicate with them. (p. 350) Semiotics emerge: The symbolic meaning originates as means of differentiating categories analogically. (p. 354)

Interesting fusion: Alfred Schutz: combines influences of Scheler, Weber, and Husserl with James, Mead, and Dewey. His work is on understanding the “other”, and derives several categories: Predecessors, successors, consociates, and contemporaries. (p. 364) Balinese ritual is of utmost importance for conducting social interaction: “lek” or “stage-fright” is disruption of theatric ritual process. This relates very closely to Goffman’s study of embarassment. (p. 402) The ritual of the cockfight is an expression of character. Highly ritual and formalized, has high symbolic importance. (p. 434) Operates on status heirarchy and loyalty: this is a performance and expression of such loyalty, it is a device ofr expressing social relationships and conflicts: deferences? (p. 441)

Notes

Chapter 1: The Medium is the Message

This is about technology, and how technology shapes us. The introduction of technology and machines is important because of the technology, not necessarily the things produced with them. The strong example here is the light bulb. “The electric light is pure information. It is a medium without a message, as it were, unless it were used to spell out some verbal ad or name.” A consequence of this last bit is that the content of a medium will always be another medium: “This fact, characteristic of all media, means that the ‘content’ of any medium is always another medium. The content of writing is speech, just as the written word is the content of print, and print is the content of the telegraph. If it is asked: ‘what is the content of speech?,’ it is necessary to say, ‘It is an actual process of thought, which is in itself nonverbal.'”

This last bit pins down the notion of a medium as a conduit. It also poses the idea that the “content” of media form a chain that extends from one’s own ineffable thoughts. McLuhan is more interested in the process by which this transfer occurs, the nature of the conduit, and the ramifications of the medium than the actual point of origination (or reception, I suppose).

Countering an argument made by General David Sarnoff, McLuhan emphasizes that it is poor reasoning to claim that media is inherently without bias. Examples are the ideas that firearms are neutral, that it is the wielders who determine their value, or that the smallpox virus is neutral, it is the way that it is used that determines its value. These are media in that they are enablers and channels of certain events and actions. Their positive existence adds onto and complicates the human condition.

McLuhan argues from cubism (which treats space and time as the content of its medium, as opposed to clear subjects), to Napoleon’s mastery of gunpowder as a medium, to the mastery of Alexis de Tocqueville over print. De Toqueville understood print as creating a kind of uniformity in France and America (whose resolutions oriented their culture around single focused ideas), but this was lacking in England because of its complex diversity of ideologies and cultural practices. McLuhan goes from there to discuss the effects of radio and modern communication in other cultures (Bedouin). These cultures have their own media and means of communication, to which we are deaf and blind because of our accustomization to our electrical world.

On the effects of media, specifically advertisements. It is silly to claim that one can pay no attention to ads, because that is in essence impossible. “The effects of technology do not occur at the level of opinions or concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily and without any resistance.” The effect of this is the slow and deliberate infiltration performed by the values and ideology of the medium being absorbed. I would say that these values must be procedural in nature.

A further effect of media is almost linguistic. Media is formative, it is so by being a staple or resource of society. The result of the saturation of a staple is the tendency for everything to connect to that staple. Economically, politically, culturally, mythologically, etc. By being suffused with media, our culture is necessarily wrought with the concepts of that media.

A thought:

Adopting a type theory approach… One might claim that, while thought is the medium that generates all other media, it is the medium of culture that is in turn generated by all other media. Because media shapes and adds to the human condition, it is a necessary effect of all media to inform the conduit of culture. This could be taken to shape what types of interactions and developments and ideas are possible within a sociological frame.

Overview

This is Erving Goffman’s most well known work, and is acknowledged as the foundation for his later work. The point of the book can really be summed up in its title: everyday life is a performance. The rest of the text serves as extrapolation and analysis, applying the thesis to numerous circumstances and situations. While Goffman is writing in 1959, his work and method serve as a remarkable starting point for the problem of character simulation within virtual worlds. It can also relate to human engagement in virtual worlds: Sociology of virtual worlds can be studied by analysis of the presentation and performance of the human participants.

Performance is Goffman’s solution to the matter of interaction, but interaction and performance both presuppose an audience. So the question of the self, the agent behind the performance is left deliberately ambiguous and unresolved. Even when alone, an individual still performs for his or her own sake. One can treat the “actual” self as the performing entity that chooses the performances, which is good enough for simulation, but seems incomplete to describe human interactors.

We can look at the self which Goffman leaves ambiguous and take it to one of two conclusions. One is that direction that Sherry Turkle might argue, that presentation gives individuals multiple perspectives on themselves. Underneath the multitude of masks can be triangulated a whole self, which is projected through each mask. So observing any single mask yields an incomplete understanding of an individual, but every additional one reveals additional details and is evidence that we are truly human underneath our shells. An opposing viewpoint might be offered by Jean Baudrillard, who asserts that the multitude of reflections is indication that there is no self underneath, that each mask is a reflection not of an agent underneath, but rather of other projections seen elsewhere. Masks are presentations that assert a reality, but this reality is a simulacra, imperfectly reproducing images seen elsewhere, images that themselves are reproductions. These reflections proceed endlessly until it is impossible to determine what the real is underneath, or whether it is there or if it ever existed in the first place.

Ultimately, we may find that Goffman’s ideas can be applied to simulation, but the ambiguous self can work for us. Simulated entities have no selves, and via sufficient indirection in software, they can reflect and represent substance found in the real world. Human interactors may find via their interaction with the simulation and its many representations better lenses and reflections to understand themselves and their surroundings.

Notes

Interaction requires knowledge of the other to understand and apply stereotypes. We have little information that we know is true to prepare us for new interactions, thus individual must express and observers must be impressed with the presentation. Reason is made on the basis of inferences – William Thomas. (p. 2)

Practices emerge around the rituals of presentation and observation. Games emerge to play with these things. Fantasy, teasing, embarassing stories serve social function for easing role portrayal, they expose a conflict between the individual and the ideal projection. This slipperyness and confusion exposes a human dimension underneath the presentation. (p. 14)

Role performances and extremes: Cynicism vs belief. Both have defensive mechanisms in protecting the performer, thus one’s relation to a performance will probably fall at one extreme or the other. Transitions may occur when a performer feels immersed or disaffected by a role. (p. 19)

The front of a performance: Forms of support that help define it and lend to its credibility. Can be setting, appearance, personal characteristics, manner. The front may be internal or external in nature. The front connects to class roles, actors may find that fronts exist for roles when taking one on. (p. 24)

Dramatizing ones work means to make the invisible costs (associated with the work) visible, as well as some other things. To appear normal or undramatic, great special care must be made. This suggests that we are more in tune with our roles and that the image of the natural may be a construct. (p. 32)

On idealization: this is a semiotic/mythological reference. Roles exist beyond the individual. The ideal is a conception of the essence of a role, to which the individual is disposable. (p. 35)

Presentation vs concealment: Individuals may conceal parts of work, or aspects of their person. This echoes Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents- that to operate in civilization, one must suppress instinct and aspects of the self. The discrepancy between the parts of work and the appearance can lend legitimacy to the work and the performance. (p. 44)

Performance is something that must not be broken: It is transcendental in a fashion. Citing Simone DeBeauvoir: Performance surpasses and eclipses the body. It is an identification with something unreal, both more than life and less than human. (p. 57)

Some misrepresentation of selves is villainized or culpable. This is a matter of authorization, though: is someone authorized to perform a role? Other times, deliberate misrepresentation is acceptable or expected. (p. 61) This is especially interesting from the simulation perspective.

The performance of being: “To be a given kind of person, then, is not merely to possess the required attributes, but also to sustain the standards of conduct and appearance that one’s social grouping attaches thereto. The unthinking ease with which performers consistently carry off such standard-maintaining routines does not deny that a performance has occurred, merely that the participants have been aware of it.” (p. 75)

Teams are to be taken as a point of reference in understanding coordinated behavior. It serves to shift focus away from the individual as acting subject, replacing it with the team. Team performance implies complicity and dependence. Formal compulsion to play a role exists in individuals, and helps tighten the dependency in team performance. (p. 81)

The line (which is discussed further in Interaction Ritual), of a performance must be maintained despite failure or disagreement among participants. They must suppress the immediate desire to punish and instruct the offender in cases when a teammate fails in a task. (p. 89)

On front and back spaces: There is a certain place for a main performance, which is the front space. However, there is also a “backstage” area where different rules apply. The boundaries between them are interesting and can lead to complications and embarrassment when permeated. Examples are the kitchen in a restaurant or a teacher’s lounge. Performance still occurs on both sides, but the audience changes, and presentation can change drastically. (p. 120)

Regions are frames and situate behavior, the front for one performer may be the back for another, these standards are culturally determined. All sides have performances, but the role-space performances are different. (p. 126)

Audience segregation: roles require space and an audience. Having a blend in the audience or space introduces uncomfortability and confusion. This leads to an interesting triad: together the performer, space, and audience define a role performance. (p. 136)

On secrets: There are several types of secrets held by individuals or teams: dark, strategic (intended to be disclosed strategically), inside (knowledge is a mark of membership), entrusted (held for others), and free. Importance of secrets is relative to the knower and the team. (p. 142)

Goffman describes several discrepant roles, kinds that blend the status of performer and audience member. These orient around the relation to performance, the relation to the audience, and types of information held. (p. 166)

Communication between performers that occurs without role of character: Staging cues, to facilitate performance and direct the audience without active character cues. Derisisive collusion [biplay] is playful mocking within roles. (p. 186)

Practices to maintain countenance and continuity of performance in face of “scenes” or “incidents”. Loyalty: maintaining the border between performers and audience. Types of defensive practices made by performers: loyalty, discipline, circumspection. (p. 212)

Tact and etiquette are protective and insulating, respectively. Tact is employed by audience to evidence respect and acknowledgment over role performances, even when performance is silly or poor. Thus its function is to protect the performer. The knowledge of the application of tact is a moment which has the potential to lay bare the constructed nature of the performance: “I would like to add a concluding fact about tact. Whenever the audience exercises tact, the possibility will arise that the performers will learn that they are being tactfully protected. When this occurs, the further possibility arises that the audience will learn that the performs know that they are being tactfully protected. And then, in turn, it becomes possible for the performers to learn that the audience knows that the performers know they are being protected. Now when such states of information exist, a moment in the performance may come when the separateness of the teams will break down and be momentarily replaced by a communication of glances through which each team openly admits to the other its state of information. At such moments the whole dramaturgical structure of social interaction is suddenly and poignantly laid bare, and the line separating the teams momentarily disappears. Whether this close view of things brings shame or laughter, the teams are likely to draw rapidly back into their appointed characters.” (p. 233) Etiquette is tactful inattention by an audience to information considered private or non-appropriate for the audience to know. Normally people are left to their own business, and etiquette is the insulating activity that keeps this separate.

The individual is divided between performer and character. Character is something to build things with. It is different from “self-production”, but can lead to synchronization. Is the thing built from characters society? (p. 252)

Overview

This text is Goffman’s last book, and focuses on an unusual subject for Goffman. Frame analysis looks at the organization and analysis of human experience and the individual. Admittedly, this still is within the framework of sociology, but the focus still returns to the individual.

Frame analysis is about how we make sense of things. How we understand “what is going on?” This process involves framing, which is the application of certain cognitive procedures onto given situations. Goffman uses a very metaphorical analysis to these, especially with respect to keying, which is a very metaphorical take on cognition and experience.

Notes:

The foreword has a nice look at Goffman’s character, his perspective on rules and society. Goffman respected rules, but was also a rule breaker. He wants to uncover truths, but many of his truths are cold ones. Goffman is notable in linking microsociology to macrosociology. (p. xvii)

Goffman offers an interesting turn on the question of reality: Instead of asking what is real, Goffman echoes James’s question: “Under what circumstances do we think things are real?” (p. 2) This connection connects William James and the tradition of phenomenology.

Goffman’s aim is to isolate frameworks, understand what is going on within perspectives. “My aim is to try to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events and to analyze the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject. I start wit the fact that from an individual’s particular point of view, while one thing may be momentarily appear to be what is really going on, in fact what is actually happening is plainly a joke, or a dream, or an accident, or a mistake, or a misunderstanding, or a deception, or a theatrical performance, and so forth.” (p. 10) A strip is a sequence of actions. Frame analysis is meant as a slogan to refer to the examination of the organization of experience.

Frameworks are tools for meaning making and discovery. They are employed whenever we recognize an event as occurring in some context. The goal is to recognize and organize occurrences in meaningful ways: essentially this is a theory of cognition. There are many and various frameworks that we use and can be applied. One example is the physical framework vs the sign framework, where one is natural and bodily while the other is abstract and cognitive. This seems like an attempt to generalize and harmonize varying theories on human nature. (p. 21)

Analyzing a game of checkers: Goffman’s approach is very different from the standard AI perspective. Frameworks address either physical or social logic, but to be human requires both. Events may be described within a framework, and answers the question “what is going on?”. Frameworks have dependency, social frameworks are rather complex. In checkers game, examples of what is going on could be, “he is moving a piece”, “he is moving his arm and holding something”, “they are playing checkers”, “he is winning”, etc. (p. 24)

Goals and effects of frameworks: (p. 36)
1) To explain all events (the inexplicable is intolerable)
2) Push the limits of explanation
3) Learning competence in actions (“mufflings” or human slips)
4) Produce unforseen consequences (significant events may be incidentally produced)
5) There is a variability of frameworks, which have different perspectives on situations, mixing natural with social, bodily with sublime or social. Not the Sims as an example which really mixes these.

Keying

Keying is a means of understanding a framework in terms of another. Essentially it is a frame metaphor. It plays an important role in understanding what is going on. The main example Goffman uses is play. Play fighting is not real fighting, but it can be accidentally mistaken as such. It borrows many devices from fighting in an almost metaphorical manner. (p.45)

Make believe, contests, ceremonies and simulation (Goffman calls this “technical reproduction”) are instances of frame application. A simulation for “practicing” relates this to both Baudrillard and role-learning/practice/performance. Simulation in this context is used to artificially replicate certain kinds of events for some audience, and this can be understood as a simulation of something else. (p. 59) Goffman cites examples in medical training (and other serious examples), as well as an example of soldiers demonstrating riot equipment to an audience of 3000 by having a fake “mob” composed of soldiers dressed as hippies rioting and then being suppressed by tear gass. This can very naturally extend to Baudrillard. Goffman is trying to address how we understand things in terms of others, but Baudrillard’s answer is that we descend to infinite regress of references, that real events are indistinguishable from real ones. Nonetheless, we need to give Goffman some credit, because whether events truly are real or simulacra, we, as observers, do tend to make that distinction.

Keyings are adaptations of common models. Derivative models may be seen as keyings of each other, or may be re-keyed themselves. It would help to look at examples where the subjects of keyings are media and media artifacts, where adaptations may be considered rekeyings when an artifact is adapted from play to print to film, etc. Goffman intends his argument to be much more generalized, though, and we can consider keyings of social situations and examples, as well. A play or film about homosexual lovers in a war may be considered keyings of a the real thing, but a real holdup experienced on a street may be considered a keying of one seen in TV or film. In this sense, all keyings hinge on representation and are simulated. (p. 79)

Fabrication and Deceit

Goffman is often concerned with deceit. In this section, he is concerned with fabrications, both benign and exploitative. These are fabrications of experience: posing and disguising one experience in terms of another. Fabrication disguises impressions of people with each other and with situations. (p. 103) An example is a Dear Abby letter, on (p. 105) where a mother is taken aback by discovering (via rummaging through thier things) that her daughters are using birth control. There are several layers to this: Fabrication implies the misrepresentation of something false as true. The mother assumes the natural relationship with her daughters as implying their absence of using birth control, or that the daughters should be open and honest with her about all things that she might see as important. Likewise the mother is also representing falsely because her presentation as an honest mother would involve not snooping through her daughters’ things. In this example, there are many layers of assumptions and presentations, but these are all formed around the very simple events of what is going on. Essentially, this is one way of looking at how a straightforward situation is turned into a big deal.

Suspicion and doubt help organize the framing of fabrication and deception. These operate on whether we think a situation is real or false. These are natural sensations, and must exist at all times, to some degree or another. (p. 122)

The Theatrical Frame

Reviewing the theatrical frame: actors are both characters and performers. The audience acts as a vicarious conspirator. Nonetheless, staged performance is very different from real life. (p. 130)

Conventions arise in various media- “frames”, representative of real models, but must take on expressions or conventions to adequately represent meaningful actions. On stage: a novel adaptation, the adaptation process is a matter of transforming novel conventions into stage ones. In this sense, we might find a general device for adaptation. This involves a certain supposition of sufficiency in character presentation: All that is to be known is shown. (p. 149)

More on Fabrication

On deception as a power relation: the imposition of a deceptive frame yields containment over subjects, who controls the deception has a sort of power of belief. The process is referential: The devices of deception are secret monitoring, penetration, entrapment. All of these are powerful because of knowledge management. This connects to Goffman’s work on secrets. (p. 177)

Fabrication of behavior in gay culture, based on [farce of] stereotypical feminine behavior. This may further be simulated by non-gay individuals, adding another frame of reference. There is a nice Baudrillard connection here. The matter of cultural acceptability is dependent on frame. (p. 194)

Out of frame activity

Goffman cites a few “scene” like examples of behavior, where someone causes a great deal of fuss by breaking rules of actions. Decorum dictates to ignore or suppress such behavior. A scene not only disrupts a role, but the continuity of a frame. What is the role to frame relation?

Anchoring of Activity

How do we know what is real? How is a frame activity grounded in reality? Keying and fabrication lets us know how to construct reality. William James: Reality must be convincing. To seem adequately real, things must be spectacular. To seem natural, TV or radio must take extreme care. But this is a form of deception. (p. 251)

Continuity is demanded between actors and characters. Even when an actor plays a role, the role becomes associated with the actor, leading to a social concern. Goffman’s examples are actors who play risque roles later moving to play more saintly ones, and encountering a sort of backlash (p. 277). This can relate to Goffman’s earlier work on audience segregation, for instance the priest who did not want to go swimming with his congregation.

On ambiguity and how to understand it: Ambiguity incurs doubt and uncertainty. It has its foundation in error, misappropriation of frames. Note: Experience is a confrontation with an order of existence. Thus, a misperception of a fact is a misperception of existence. Thus, the actor uses not the wrong word, but the wrong language. Wittgenstein ref. (p. 308)

Frame analysis of talk

Application of keying and frame analysis to conversation: Heavily embodied nature of conversation leads to a density of keying, and introduction of many layers. Compare especially with computer mediated communication, which develops conventions, but lacks the key density of conversation. Conversation involves a certain looseness to the world. (p. 502)

On replaying: “A tale or an anecdote, that is, a replaying, is not merely any reporting of a past event. In the fullest sense, it is such a statement couched from the personal perspective of an actual or potential participant who is located so that some temporal, dramatic development of the reported event proceeds from that starting point. A replaying will therefore, incidentally, be something that listeners can empathetically insert themselves into, vicariously reexperiencing what took place. A replaying, in brief, recounts a personal experience, not merely reports on an event.” (p. 504)

Description is narrative, it is presented dramatically, and operates on a scripted nature of performances and stories. Description and narrative portray a total knowledge (or complete knowability) of the situation involved, where, realistically, that is false. Goffman uses heavy reference to playing and recording of events here, and this metaphor informs his argument. (p. 508)

Conclusion

Ordinary behavior has symbolization, but symbolized action is more akin to dance. But it ultimately derives from the body. (p. 569) Goffman concludes by citing Merleau-Ponty, in that the self is defined in terms of the other. (p. 575-576)

Overview

Goffman outlines in several essays approaches to human interaction from a dramaturgical perspective. To Goffman, all forms of interaction are kinds of performances. These performances may fall under the structure of rituals, socially acceptable formalized interactions. One of Goffman’s goals is to outline the units of these interactions so that they may be studied in a symbolic manner. Goffman is directly influenced by George Mead, and has gone on to influence others (Kenneth Burke, I think), Manford Kuhn, and McCall and Simmons.

Notes

Goffman opens by discussing the need for study of low level behavior as it relates to interaction. He wants to find the natural units of interaction. Wants to find an order that transcends the individual culture being studied. The study of interactions lies not in the individual, but within the acts between the individual and others [social grouping] (This is the oppostite of McCall and Simmons stated approach). Goffman sees here to find a minimal model of social interaction. (p. 1-2)

On Face-Work

Goffman’s first essay is on “Face Work”, this is face in the sense of saving face. It is the dramatic presentation of self displayed to others. This is exaggerated and attuned to current social drama/interaction. Also related is the concept of a “line”, which is a pattern of acts that express an engagement with the situation. Lines sound scripted and this is probably Goffman’s intent. (p. 5) Most encounters are conventionalized: there are only a few options available to an individual. The choice between the options is dependent on immediate and long term goals. (p. 7) There is behavior evidence of being in the right face for a situation: a person responds with confidence, assurance, and security when in right face. When in wrong face, a person is likely to feel ashamed, judged, or threatened. (p. 8) Face is transferable: there is a system of obligation and interaction, individuals can allow others to take face instead of themselves. Face becomes sort of an obligational currency. (p. 9)

There are several methods for responding to threats to face made by others (whether intentional or not). Intentional threats are malicious insults, while unintentional ones are faux passes, misunderstandings, and the like. (p. 14) There are rituals to address the loss of face. Avoidance is one approach, avoiding the cause of the threat. To repair threats is performed via rituals intended to restore equilibrium. (p. 19) A simple example is when A bumps into B in the street. A says “excuse me”, B says “certainly”. Those speech acts are the corrective ritual.

Aggressive interchanges are contests of face work. This is when face is used as a resource in conflicts. These exchanges generally require audiences and are performances themselves. Many social contests can be explained by this. (p. 25) Dynamics of class and other factors limits face work. In matter of choosing face work, the dilemma is not the enactment of the incident, but the confusion over what face to use to handle it. (p. 26)

Ritual means playing oneself. (p. 32) The symbolic function of discourse is not (just) the exchange or communication of ideas, but the play of assertions. (p. 38) Relationships imply some dependency for face saving. Compare with relationship dynamics described by McCall and Simmons. Face saving is a currency of the relationship. (p. 42) On finding one’s place in social establishment: “Whatever his position in society, the person insulates himself by blindness, half-truths, illusions, and rationalizations. He makes an ‘adjustment’ by convincing himself, with the tactful support of his intimate circle, that the is what he wants to be and that he would not do to gain his ends what the others have done to gain theirs.” (p. 43)

On construct-like approach to human nature: “Universal human nature is not a very human thing. By acquiring it, the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without.” (p. 45) This justifies the validity of simulation somewhat, and calls to point Weizenbaum’s fear of the machine-like nature of individuals. Sociologists have been likening men to machines for much longer than AI researchers and computer scientists.

The Nature of Deference and Demeanor

Deference and demeanor are factors in the code of conduct between individuals. Goffman’s study focuses on an observational study of patients at a mental hospital. Goffman’s focus in this chapter are the notions of obligation and expectation. This relates to the conduct between different classes of individuals: what is expected or obliged from one class to another. (p. 50) There are boundaries of classes, and usually multiple of these present in any circumstance. In given situations certain of these boundaries may take priority. For example, in hospital, the patient/staff boundary trumps the white/black boundary. (p. 52) Some rules are symmetric or asymmetric across boundaries. Symmetric rules are ones in which individuals have the same obligations to each other. An asymmetric rule is one where one group has authority or precedence over another. Social rules may be formal or informal. Formal rules have some degree of ostensible substance or value and are formalized to protect that substance. Informal rules are ceremonial, things like greetings, whose sole purpose is to guide conduct, their substance is secondary. (p. 53-54) The ceremonial idiom is that the tokens for ceremonial purposes have meanings for certain groups. (p. 56)

Goffman on deference: “By deference I shall refer to that component of activity which functions as a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to a recipient of this recipient or of something which this recipient is taken as a symbol, extension, or agent.” (p. 56) In rituals of obeisance, deference is given from one under authority to someone in authority. Implies casting, separation of social groups. But there are symmetric deferences, that superordinates owe to subordinates. The meaning may be present or abstract. Over deference deprives the act of meaning. (p. 58-59) Deference exists to enforce order on top of the actual sentiment. Omission of deference implies destructuralization and rebellion. Deference also maintains artificial difference or distance. (p. 60) There are a variety of styles in personal/relationship/formal distance: polite conversation with the boss in the elevator, patient doctor communication, filling station boss. The use and effect of style depends on the situation. (p. 65)

Types of presentation rituals: salutations, invitations, compliments, minor services; these are about inclusion. Presentation rituals and avoidance rituals are opposing in nature. “Through all of these the recipient is told that he is not an island unto himself and that others are, or seek to be, involved with him and with his personal private concerns. Taken together, these rituals provide a continuous symbolic tracing of the extent to which the recipient’s ego has not been bounded and barricaded in regard to others.” (p. 72-73)

Where deference is the code of conduct with others, demeanor is the code of conduct of oneself. Demeanor creates a self image, but for others. (p. 80) There is a dilemma regarding how to fully express oneself: to express oneself as a complete person, both deference and demeanor are necessary. Individuals must interact with each other and cooperate to express wholeness. (p. 84)

Ceremonial profanations are used to express and borderline cases and broaches of deference or demeanor. These are unique in that they express boundaries or contempt, but do not change social structure. These may be playful or contemptful, there are forms of ritualized contempt that are standard forms of expressing dissatisfaction of one kind or another (the middle finger, the slap, the insult, etc.) (p. 85)

“It is therefore important to see that the self is in part a ceremonial thing, a sacred object that must be treated with the proper ritual care and in turn must be presented in a proper light to others. As a means through which this self is established, the individual acts with proper demeanor while in contact with others and is treated by others with deference.” And later: “An environment, then, in terms of the ceremonial component of activity, is a place where it is easy or difficult to play the ritual game of having a self.” (p. 91)

Embarrassment and Social Organization

This essay is about the phenomenon of embarrassment and how it fits in with social organization. Goffman’s intent is to uncover what embarrassment is, why it happens, and how it happens. Goffman asks specifically, “By whom is the embarrassing incident caused? To whom is it embarrassing? For whom is the embarrassment felt?”. There is a vast spectrum of embarrassment: mild moments versus sustained difficult embarrassed encounters. The mechanics of embarrassment: loss of equilibrium or self control, paralysis of response. (p. 100) In playing embarrassment: becomes a dance of concealment in hiding embarrassment, when that breaks down, it becomes physical response: deep physical/emotional experience. (This is something existing under the surface, as a core biological, asocial quality, independent of standard social simulation.) The collapse of the individual implies a collapse of a larger social system, unless the system ritualizes the handling of the individual. Without resolution, new social rules must be chosen or established to deal with situation. (p. 103) Embarrassment is caused by a failure of expectations: Social obligations are not sustained. In Role centric view, one’s role is not supported, and one feels embarrassed by the failure of the role-identity. (p. 105)

Embarrassment also serves an important role in social change. The social structure is made elastic by the ritual of embarrassment: Individuals may change their presentation of self (their role identities as well?) expressing additional depth via the occurrence of embarrassment, whether it is their own or otherwise. Exact moment nature of embarrassment is complicated by its establishment in social ritual, namely embarrassment is failure of ritual, but is ritualized anyway. This allows a meta-reflexivity in ritual system, this could be made to encourage elasticity, but it could be made to make it more brittle. (p. 112)

Where the Action Is

Goffman’s sense of “Action” is of the dramatic sort. This is the idea of important or meaningful or significant acts or events which are performed or are participated in by people. Action is merely a vehicle to uncover the deeper quality of character. This essay is an interesting and extended journey. It starts with discussion of games of chance and risk, and progresses to the larger sense of consequentiality in moments. One can kill time, and that killed time is inconsequential. There is an apparent axis of actions: consequential versus inconsequential, apart from that there becomes a question of whether actions are problematic, when one is at odds to figure out what to do. (p. 164)

Corporeality and embodiment: A body is a piece of consequential equipment. Compare with a digital presence or avatar? These are usually inconsequential, but may become consequential via enactment. (p. 167) Goffman discusses body in consequential work: in perilous roles, the body is the object of practical gambles. (p. 172) When one lives consequentially when the gamble is less practical, one must cope somehow. The Calvinistic (fated) solution is to deny the effect of consequence: so nothing can really go wrong. (p. 175)

An alternative to cope is what Goffman calls “defense”, which is a ritualized defense of action. When actions are uncertain and of high consequence, a defensive ritual is performed to save culpability of the individual. Defenses imbue a fateful event with ritual and external meaning. Compare the compulsive gambler to the professional statistical gambler. To the compulsive gambler, the dice are magical. Can also compare Weizenbaum’s compulsive programmer here. (p. 178)

Games reduce all behavior to [supposedly, at least within the game world] fateful action. A social game should do the same. Action is the quality of sustained fateful behavior. (p. 181) Results of action: “making it”, vs “blowing it”. You can either win big or loose big. (p. 193) Action is also the staging ground for the cult of masculinity in Western culture; in this, females are “passive ground” for interpersonal social action. (p. 209-210)

Qualities of character: These are qualities of self control in fateful situations: Courage, Gameness, Integrity, Gallantry, Composure, Presence of Mind, Dignity, Stage Confidence. Each of these is discussed in some detail as means of engaging with action, fatefulness, and consequence. (p. 218-226) Given these, we can look at man as not need-driven, but rather character-driven. (p. 258)